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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF MODERN WARFARE:
HISTORY, PATHOLOGIES, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

OONA A. HATHAWAY, TOBIAS KUEHNE, RANDI MICHEL &
NICOLE NG*
ABSTRACT
Despite significant developments in the nature of twenty-first
century warfare, Congress continues to employ a twentieth century
oversight structure. Modern warfare tactics, including cyber operations, drone strikes, and special operations, do not neatly fall into
congressional committee jurisdictions. Counterterrorism and cyber
operations, which are inherently multi-jurisdictional and highly
classified, illustrate the problem. In both contexts, over the past
several years Congress has addressed oversight shortcomings by
strengthening its reporting requirements, developing relatively robust
oversight regimes. But in solving one problem, Congress has created
another: deeply entrenched information silos that inhibit the sharing
of information about modern warfare across committees. This has
real consequences. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
House Foreign Affairs Committee may have to vote on an authorization for the use of military force against a country without a full
understanding of options for covert operations that might achieve
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the same purpose with less risk. The House and Senate Armed
Services Committees may be asked to approve a train-and-equip program for a partner force in a nation without knowing that the CIA
is already operating essentially the same program. And the House
and Senate Intelligence Committees may support a proposed covert
operation without understanding the broader foreign policy context,
and therefore, the reaction that it might provoke if it were discovered.
But there is good news with the bad. If Congress is to blame for
this information siloing, Congress is also able to fix it. This Article’s
discussion of solutions begins with a proposal made by the 9/11
Commission to address information sharing failures—the formation
of a super committee to address national security matters. After
explaining why this is not the right answer, this Article offers four
concrete proposals to remedy the problem. First, Congress should
promote inter-committee information sharing by expanding crosscommittee membership. Second, Congress should require joint
briefings to committees when matters cut across jurisdictional
boundaries. Third, Congress should permit members to share
classified information with other members under limited, clearly
defined circumstances. And fourth, Congress should create a
Congressional National Security Council to coordinate cross-cutting
national security matters and share mutually relevant information.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 4, 2017, eleven American Special Forces soldiers
traveling with a small Nigerien convoy were ambushed by fighters
armed with rocket-propelled grenades, mortars, and heavy machine
guns. Four American soldiers—Staff Sergeant Bryan C. Black, Staff
Sergeant Jeremiah W. Johnson, Staff Sergeant Dustin M. Wright,
and Sergeant LaDavid Johnson—were separated from their unit
and left to battle the militants for more than four hours. Their
tortuous fight to stay alive was later pieced together after their
deaths using video footage from overhead drones and Sergeant
Wright’s helmet cam.1
Seven months later, on May 10, 2018, the Pentagon produced a
6000-page classified report on the incident but released just an 8page summary to the public.2 After the Senate Armed Services
Committee (SASC) received a classified briefing from the Pentagon,
Senator Tim Kaine accused the military of hiding the true nature of
its mission in Niger from Congress: “I have deep questions on
whether the military is following instructions and limitations that
Congress has laid down about the mission of these troops in Africa.”3
The legal authorization to conduct a “train-and-equip” mission in
Niger was, he argued, “a fig leaf” and the briefing, far from answering questions, raised concerns “about why people are hiding from us
what they’re doing.”4 Republican senator and SASC chairman John
1. See Rukmini Callimachi, Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Alan Blinder & Thomas
Gibbons-Neff, “An Endless War”: Why 4 U.S. Soldiers Died in a Remote African Desert, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/17/world/africa/nigerambush-american-soldiers.html [https://perma.cc/SH4G-UDU4] (noting that Congress had not
been properly notified of the mission); Press Release, U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Africa
Command Statement on Situation in Niger (Oct. 5, 2017), https://ne.usembassy.gov/u-s-africacommand-statement-situation-niger/ [https://perma.cc/Z8LN-GWUL].
2. Defense Department Briefing on Niger Ambush Investigation, C-SPAN (May 10, 2018),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4728893/pentagon-report-blames-niger-ambush-series-failures
[https://perma.cc/DV6X-CYCY]; U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., OCT 2017 NIGER AMBUSH: SUMMARY OF
INVESTIGATION 1 (2018), https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_niger/img/Oct2017-Niger-Ambush-Summary-of-Investigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9CH-4NRC].
3. Joe Gould, Did Military Hide the Real Mission of the Niger Ambush from Congress?,
DEF. NEWS (May 8, 2018), https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2018/05/08/did-military-hidniger-mission-from-congress-key-senator-asks/ [https://perma.cc/6Y8U-RKEN].
4. Id.
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McCain joined in the criticism, stating that he knew “[v]ery little”
about the U.S. Special Forces presence in Niger, and “[w]e’re just
not getting the information in the timely fashion that we need.”5
Senator Lindsey Graham, too, complained, “We don’t know exactly
where we’re at in the world, militarily, and what we’re doing.”6
The members of Congress were right: no one in Congress
understood the full extent of U.S. involvement in Niger—or in other
countries with similar multi-faceted operations. But this confusion
did not result, at least not primarily, from the executive branch
hiding what it was doing from Congress. The problem was more
pernicious: various elements of the military and covert activities in
Niger had been briefed to various congressional committees, but no
committee—and no member of Congress—was in a position to put
all the pieces together. A former congressional staff member
explained:
This was an example of stovepiping within and across committees. From what I could piece together, the DOD [Department of
Defense] had sought and Congress approved programming
under several different authorities for engaging with the
Nigeriens. Some were Title 10 train-and-equip programs, and
others were likely special operations authorities for clandestine
operations ... Each of them was likely sent up as an individual
package to Congress.... [Everything] was notified in pieces. No
one was in a position to put those pieces together.7

This Article is about the pathologies caused by this “stovepiping”—or what we call “siloing”—of information about modern U.S.
national security operations. The information barriers reflected in
5. Karoun Demirjian, McCain Threatens to Subpoena Trump Aides for Information on
Niger Attack That Left 4 U.S. Troops Dead, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/powerpost/mccain-threatens-to-subpoena-trump-aides-for-information-on-nigerattack-that-left-four-troops-dead/2017/10/19/2106450e-b500-11e7-9e58-e6288544af98_story.
html [https://perma.cc/J8XY-9GQ7].
6. Daniella Diaz, Key Senators Say They Didn’t Know the U.S. Had Troops in Niger,
CNN (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/23/politics/niger-troops-lawmakers/index.
html [https://perma.cc/M2Z8-2KKQ].
7. Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6 (Feb. 19, 2021). The staff
member stated that these comments were not based on classified information; these
comments were the result of this staff member’s efforts to piece together what happened
based on public reports.
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the Niger episode are endemic to the entire military, intelligence,
and foreign affairs oversight structure as it currently exists. Crucial
information about certain activities is often available only to a small
cadre of congressional members and staffers. As a result, few members, if any, have access to all the relevant information.8 This means
that members of Congress are sometimes left to make decisions that
bear on national security and foreign relations in the absence of
essential information. In short, members of Congress lack the full
picture of American force capabilities, hindering their ability to
fulfill their constitutional role in overseeing the executive branch
and helping to protect the country.9
When it works as it should, oversight ensures that Congress can
serve as an effective check on the executive branch. Congressional
oversight is essential to calibrating national decision-making to
political and policy concerns; preventing waste, fraud, and abuse;
and ensuring government programs respect civil liberties and comply with the law.10 As outside observers, members of Congress and
their staff can identify operational gaps, strategic shortcomings,
bureaucratic mission creep, and groupthink. Congressional oversight can also provide democratic legitimacy, especially since
national security and foreign policy activities frequently take place
outside the public’s view.
8. See id.
9. Article I of the Constitution gives the legislature the power “[t]o declare war,” “raise
and support Armies,” “provide and maintain a Navy,” “provide for calling forth the Militia,”
and “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See
generally Michael J. Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for PurseStrings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1, 6-13 (1975) (arguing that presidential war powers
are subordinate to congressional war powers); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 231, 234 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that the Constitution empowers Congress to
regulate the executive’s war powers); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION
80 (1972) (stating that Congress holds primary war power). Congress also has the constitutional authority, and responsibility, to conduct oversight of the executive branch. See
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of the Congress to conduct
investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes.”); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (holding that the Framers
intended Congress to have “the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it,” and that the
oversight power “is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function”).
10. See, e.g., S. SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S DETENTION AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM, S. REP. NO. 113-288, at xiii-xiv
(2014).
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Given the importance of oversight, Congress’s current information-sharing challenges have real consequences. To take just a few
examples: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and
House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) may have to vote on an
authorization for use of force without understanding options for
covert operations that could achieve a similar purpose with less
risk, potentially leading to unnecessary and ill-advised operations.
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and SASC may be
asked to approve a train-and-equip program for a partner force in
a nation without knowing that the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) is already operating essentially the same program—creating
the possibility that the overlapping programs might not only waste
money, but actually undermine each other. And the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) may support a proposed covert
operation without understanding the broader foreign policy context—and the reaction it might cause if discovered.
While Congress’s failure to share information across committees
may have always been a problem to some degree, it has grown
markedly over the last decade with the rise of modern national
security operations that do not fit neatly within the committees’
jurisdictional boxes. In the wake of 9/11, the rise of light footprint
special operations and remotely piloted aircraft (colloquially known
as “drones”) combined intelligence and military tactics. This led to
a blurring of the lines between traditional military oversight,
codified under Title 10, and intelligence oversight, codified under
Title 50.11 The convergence of Title 10 and Title 50 has become more
pronounced as the share of cross-cutting operations in the U.S.
operational structure has grown over the last two decades.12 The
rise in the last decade of cyber operations, which also do not fit

11. See Maggie Miller & Laura Kelly, Congress Struggles on Rules for Cyber Warfare with
Iran, THE HILL (Jan. 12, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/477795congress-struggles-on-rules-for-cyber-warfare-with-iran [https://perma.cc/8J4N-C4HF]; Robert
Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J.
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 539, 615-16 (2012) (discussing the convergence of Title 10 and Title 50);
Andru E. Wall, Demystifying the Title 10-Title 50 Debate: Distinguishing Military Operations,
Intelligence Activities & Covert Action, 3 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 85, 86-88 (2011).
12. See infra Part II.A; see also Chesney, supra note 11, at 581-82.
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neatly into Congress’s existing oversight structure, further complicates the current oversight picture.
As these modern forms of warfare have become increasingly
important to U.S. military and intelligence operations, this failure
of fit has created more and more glaring problems. To begin with,
modern forms of warfare do not easily map onto the War Powers
Resolution (WPR) framework governing the use of force. After all,
drones, special operations, and cyber operations do not generally
involve many “boots on the ground,” which some regard as a key
trigger of the Resolution’s framework.13 Standing alone, cyber operations in particular have fallen below the threshold for “hostilities” that would trigger the WPR reporting framework.14 Congress
has responded to these challenges in the last few years by iteratively adding reporting requirements for modern warfare operations.15
But in the process it has left too many members of Congress in the
dark about modern warfare operations that are directly relevant to
their work.
Drawing on interviews with current and former lawyers and
professional staff members in Congress and the executive branch,16
this Article shows that the siloing problem in modern national
security operations has undermined Congress’s ability to conduct
adequate oversight. This, in turn, threatens to harm U.S. national
security. Our focus in this Article is on modern “warfare”—that is,
activities involved in war—as well as activities that support them
and offer alternatives to them. But the problems we identify are not
limited to “warfare”; they affect the entire U.S. national security
system. Moreover, in casting a spotlight on the oversight of modern
warfare, we aim to illuminate a bigger problem that plagues
Congress: it is not structured to efficiently and effectively oversee
issues that cross the jurisdictional boundaries of its longstanding
committee structure (committees that were in some cases created
13. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
15. See infra Part II.A.2.
16. As explained supra note *, we sought and received an exemption from the Yale Human
Research Protection Program Institutional Review Board. Unless specifically noted, interviews are anonymous to allow interviewees, many of whom currently work in government, to
speak candidly. For any significant assertion, we sought confirmation from multiple sources.
All interviews were conducted remotely by Zoom.
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over a century ago). This problem is especially pronounced in areas
that involve classified information because members of Congress
and their staff cannot fill gaps in their knowledge by drawing on
publicly available information.
While this Article discusses modern warfare writ large, it places
emphasis on cyber operations, which are inherently multi-jurisdictional and therefore a particularly vexing version of the problem.
Cyber also represents a growing element of the United States’s
warfighting capacity.17 Some observers have argued that Congress
does not have sufficient oversight jurisdiction over cyber military
operations.18 To the extent that was once true, recent legislative
fixes have expanded Congress’s oversight role so that only a few
modest gaps remain (assuming executive branch compliance with
reporting requirements). Indeed, as a congressional staff member
observed, “literally every committee on the Hill has a piece of cyber.”19 But as we will show, the core problem is not lack of oversight—it is that oversight is scattered across committees that fail
to share relevant information with other committees that might
have a stake in the issue. The recent Cyberspace Solarium Commission criticized congressional oversight for being too dispersed
across numerous committees and subcommittees. To address the
issue, it recommended the creation of a consolidated committee on
cybersecurity.20 But this proposed solution makes the mistake of
viewing cyber in isolation from Congress’s other oversight obligations. If adopted, it could solve one problem—the disjointed cyber
oversight system—while exacerbating another: the inadequate
sharing of information about cyber operations with committees that
have related jurisdictions. We propose a different solution that addresses both issues.

17. See Tyler K. Lowe, Mapping the Matrix: Defining the Balance Between Executive
Action and Legislative Regulation in the New Battlefield of Cyberspace, 17 SCHOLAR: ST.
MARY’S L. REV. ON RACE & SOC. JUST. 63, 64-66 (2015).
18. See, e.g., id. at 92-93; Eric Lorber, Comment, Executive Warmaking Authority and
Offensive Cyber Operations: Can Existing Legislation Successfully Constrain Presidential
Power?, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 961, 1001-02 (2013).
19. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #3 (Oct. 7, 2020).
20. See U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N, REPORT 31, 35-36 (2020), https://s.wsj.net/
public/resources/documents/CSC%20Final%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6V5B-Z855].
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The multi-jurisdictional nature of modern warfare is a problem
that affects both Congress and the executive branch. But the
executive branch has a number of structures that encourage, indeed
require, collaboration across agencies. Chief among them is the
National Security Council (NSC), which creates an extensive process
for interagency collaboration, cooperation, and coordination on
policy and legal issues.21 This structure aims to ensure coordination
among the executive branch agencies involved in national security
matters, regardless of formal agency jurisdiction. Remarkably, there
is no corresponding structure on the congressional side. As one
interviewee put it:
[T]here have been debates about Congress structuring itself to
take a whole of government approach to issues like this. It’s
hard enough in the executive branch. But they have a number
of ways to try to integrate across their functional stovepipes. We
still face that problem in Congress. There have been attempts at
reform, but none have succeeded.22

Simply put, a central problem facing congressional oversight—
siloing—is of Congress’s own making. It is the result of turf battles
and political infighting. That is the bad news. The good news is that
a problem created by Congress can be fixed by Congress. While presidential administrations come and go and may bring with them
different degrees of compliance with legislative requirements, sustained and improved oversight of modern warfare should begin with
structural reform in Congress.23
Why, if this problem is of Congress’s own making and is within
Congress’s control to address, has Congress not already acted? At
least part of the answer is that most members do not know what
they are missing. As one former congressional staffer put it: “There
21. See generally RICHARD A. BEST JR., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30840, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT (2011).
22. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5 (Jan. 27, 2021).
23. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman III, Trump’s Defense Against Subpoenas Makes No Legal
Sense, ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/01/ trumpsdefense-against-subpoenas/605635 [https://perma.cc/EM4X-VPHR]; Burgess Everett & Josh
Dawsey, White House Orders Agencies to Ignore Democrats’ Oversight Requests, POLITICO
(June 2, 2017, 5:11 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/02/federal-agencies-oversightrequests-democrats-white-house-239034 [https://perma.cc/VP9U-L9WS].
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aren’t many members worked up about this issue, because they
don’t have a full view of the problem.”24 He continued: “They may
get the information they think they should be getting. But they
don’t know the information they aren’t getting access to. The same
is true of the staff level. They do not know what they do not know.”25
Moreover, those who do have most of the information—especially
members of the so-called Gang of Eight,26 which includes congressional leadership—are not always interested in sharing.27
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I shows how Congress
has constructed three distinct oversight channels for military and
intelligence operations: the foreign relations and foreign affairs
committees to oversee country missions, use of force, and war powers; the armed services committees to oversee the Department of
Defense (DOD) and its Title 10 operations; and, most recently, the
intelligence committees to provide oversight of the intelligence
community and its operations, most of which are conducted under
Title 50. Part II then turns to the challenges posed by the rise of
modern forms of warfare. Since 9/11, military and intelligence
capabilities have increasingly converged.28 As the DOD developed its
own intelligence tools and clandestine programs,29 and the CIA
acquired new lethal capabilities (most notably, drones),30 the separate oversight regimes became both more incoherent and spotty.
Recognizing the emerging oversight gaps, Congress began in 2011
to pass statutes specific to special forces, lethal strikes, and cyber
24. Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
25. Id.
26. The “Gang of Eight” includes the House and Senate minority and majority leaders as
well as the HPSCI and SSCI chairs and ranking members. See 50 U.S.C. § 3093(c)(2).
27. The same is generally true of the intelligence committees, which are particularly
protective of their access. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, former Chief Counsel to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (under Chairman Bob Corker (R-TN)) and former Senior
Counsel to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (under Chairman Mike
Rogers (R-MI)) (Jan. 21, 2021) (“The intelligence committees don’t regularly provide TS/SCI
[Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information] access to noncommittee members because
they jealously protect access to such sensitive materials.”).
28. See Corri Zoli, The Changing Role of Law in Security Governance: Post-9/11 “Gray
Zones” and Strategic Impacts, 67 SYRACUSE L. REV. 613, 626 (2017).
29. See Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Threats and Responses: A C.I.A. Rival; Pentagon
Sets Up Intelligence Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/24/
world/threats-and-responses-a-cia-rival-pentagon-sets-up-intelligence-unit.html [https://
perma.cc/7Q35-FRCY].
30. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 566 (discussing the CIA’s “kinetic turn”).
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operations,31 granting larger oversight roles to HASC and SASC.32
But while this approach filled oversight gaps and clarified ambiguities, it also reinforced and entrenched existing divisions in
committee jurisdictions.33 Part III discusses the key pathology that
this system has produced: information siloing. We argue that information siloing has prevented relevant committees from receiving
critical national security information, impeding their ability to
conduct informed lawmaking—a key function of congressional oversight. Moreover, we show that Congress, not the executive, has
created these oversight challenges through committee infighting
and turf protection. Part IV turns to solutions, offering proposals
for ensuring members of Congress and the committees are fully
informed so that Congress can more effectively carry out its lawmaking duties and serve as a meaningful check on the executive.

31. When this Article speaks of cyber, it discusses cyber operations specific to modern
warfare. Cybersecurity, such as working with private companies to secure domestic networks,
is beyond the scope of this Article. For more information on congressional oversight of cybersecurity, see Carrie Cordero & David Thaw, Rebooting Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight,
CTR. NEW AM. SEC. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rebooting-con
gressional-cybersecurity-oversight [https://perma.cc/C672-VWWA]. Likewise, foreign election
interference through misinformation and disinformation campaigns on social media is also
beyond our scope. See, e.g., Mark Scott, Russia Is Back, Wilier than Ever—And It’s Not Alone,
POLITICO (Sept. 14, 2020, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/14/russia-cyber
attacks-election-413757 [https://perma.cc/WW29-62DC].
32. See Kelsey D. Atherton, Trump Inherited the Drone War but Ditched Accountability,
FOREIGN POL’Y (May 22, 2020, 12:57 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/22/obama-dronestrump-killings-count [https://perma.cc/R7K9-EQ6M].
33. This Article focuses on the armed services, intelligence, and foreign relations committees because they have the most significant oversight roles over modern warfare operations.
See Cordero & Thaw, supra note 31. Of course, other agencies and their respective oversight
committees may sometimes be involved in modern warfare operations. For example, the
Department of Justice’s controversial legal analyses of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques created oversight equities for the judiciary committees. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, NO
MORE EXCUSES: A ROADMAP TO JUSTICE FOR CIA TORTURE 2 (2015), https://www.hrw.org/
report/2015/12/01/no-more-excuses/roadmap-justice-cia-torture [https://perma.cc/Z36M-T5J2].
See generally S. REP. NO. 113-288 (2014). The judiciary committees also engage with cybersecurity oversight in the context of surveillance, cybercrime enforcement, and data privacy.
See Cordero & Thaw, supra note 31. The homeland security committees may play a related
oversight role. See id. For example, the Department of Homeland Security is responsible for
securing civilian cyber infrastructure and coordinating cybersecurity efforts with the private
sector. See id.
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I. HISTORY OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
This Part examines the congressional committees that are primarily involved in overseeing military and intelligence operations.
First, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and House
Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) oversee foreign missions, authorizations of the use of military force, and war powers reporting.34
Second, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) and Senate
Armed Services Committee (SASC) oversee the DOD and “traditional military activities” conducted under Title 10.35 And third, the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) handle intelligence
oversight—operations that generally take place under the Title 50
authority of the CIA and other intelligence agencies and programs
(including, at times, DOD intelligence programs).36 As we will see in
the next Part, these committee structures may have worked well for
traditional warfare, but they have proven a poor fit in the era of
modern warfare.
A. The Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees
Foreign affairs have been subject to informal, ad hoc oversight by
the House and Senate since the Founding.37 As the young Republic’s
diplomatic business grew steadily over the first few decades, both
chambers soon created standing committees to oversee it: SFRC

34. See Guide to House Records: Chapter 10, NAT’L ARCHIVES, ¶ 10.1, https://www.archiv
es.gov/legislative/guide/house/chapter-10.html#CmtForeignAffairs1810 [https://perma.cc/
6X8Q-C4LU] [hereinafter HFAC Background]; S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., BACKGROUND
INFORMATION ON THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. DOC. NO.
105-28, at 4 (2000) [hereinafter SFRC BACKGROUND].
35. See Wall, supra note 11, at 102-03, 122; STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE RULE
XXV(C)(1), S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 20 (2013), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-113s
doc18/pdf/CDOC-113sdoc18.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD9S-J7KB] [hereinafter SENATE RULES].
36. See Wall, supra note 11, at 101-05.
37. See HFAC Background, supra note 34, ¶ 10.1; SFRC BACKGROUND, supra note 34, at
4.
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was established in 181638 and HFAC followed in 1822.39 Although
the precise jurisdictions of the foreign relations committees have
shifted over the centuries, they have always been responsible for
oversight of relations with other nations.40 In recent years, this has
translated into jurisdiction over the State Department, including
U.S. embassies abroad, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).41
The committees have traditionally overseen decisions to declare
war, authorize traditional military interventions, and shape relations with foreign nations.42 That jurisdiction has been deeply
connected to the War Powers Resolution (WPR)43 since its passage
in 1973.44 Enacted in response to concerns that the executive branch
had abused its war powers in Southeast Asia,45 the WPR requires
the President to notify and consult Congress regarding the introduction of armed forces into hostilities;46 provide periodic updates to
Congress throughout the duration of involvement in hostilities;47
and withdraw armed forces from hostilities after sixty days unless
38. SFRC BACKGROUND, supra note 34, at 4.
39. HFAC Background, supra note 34, at 10.2.
40. See SFRC BACKGROUND, supra note 34, at 4-6. Unless specifically noted otherwise,
“foreign relations committees” refers collectively to both the House Foreign Affairs Committee
and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
41. H. COMM. ON RULES, 116TH CONG., RULES ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 143 (Comm. Print 2019) [hereinafter
HFAC RULES]; S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 117TH CONG., RULES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS 1 (Comm. Print 2021) [hereinafter SFRC RULES].
42. See HFAC RULES, supra note 41, at 143; SFRC RULES, supra note 41, at 1.
43. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
44. See War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
45. See Edwin B. Firmage, The War Power of Congress and Revision of the War Powers
Resolution, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 237, 248-49 (1991); see also LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR
POWER 128 (1995).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (“The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every
such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces
are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.”); Id.
§ 1543(a)(3)(A)-(C) (“In the absence of a declaration of war” the President must submit a report within forty-eight hours detailing “the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
United States Armed Forces; the constitutional and legislative authority under which such
introduction took place; and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement.”).
47. Id. § 1543(c) (requiring the President to update Congress on the status, scope, and duration of hostilities no less than once every six months).
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otherwise authorized by Congress.48 WPR oversight, along with
congressional decisions to authorize the use of military force
(AUMF), fall under the jurisdiction of the foreign relations committees.49 The WPR’s rigorous restraint provisions came under attack
almost immediately after it was passed. Presidents since Nixon
have questioned the constitutionality of the WPR,50 although they
have generally complied with its reporting requirements by filing
reports “consistent with the War Powers Resolution.”51 The WPR’s
ambiguity and interpretive flexibility—especially regarding the
term “hostilities”—has limited its scope and practical effect.52 The
WPR does not define what constitutes “hostilities,” and no legislation or court decisions have offered more specificity.53 Even though
48. The sixty-day limit can be extended for thirty days by the President if he certifies that
“unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces” requires
their continued use in the course of bringing about their removal. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
49. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Foreign Rels., Senators Propose Legislation
to Update Authorities Used to Fight Terror Abroad (Apr. 16, 2018), https://www.foreign.sen
ate.gov/press/chair/release/senators-propose-legislation-to-update-authorities-used-to-fightterror-abroad [https://perma.cc/XW3U-7YWS].
50. President Nixon vetoed the WPR, which Congress overrode. Veto of War Powers
Resolution, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1285 (Oct. 24, 1973). Nixon believed that the
legislation was unconstitutional because it would undermine the President’s war powers. Id.
at 1286. In particular, he took issue with the sixty-day withdrawal provision and the provision
permitting Congress to mandate withdrawal of forces through concurrent (now joint) resolution. See id.; see also Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: Time
to Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 2-6 (1998) (providing an account of the legislative history
of the WPR); Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an Unconstitutional,
Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud that Contributed Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, 45 CASE W.
RSRV. J. INT’L L. 109, 127 (2012) (arguing that the WPR is unconstitutional). For counterarguments, see, for example, Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV. 101, 101 (1984).
51. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42699, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICE
23-25 (2019). From 1975 through March 2017, Presidents submitted 168 reports pursuant to
the WPR. Id.; see also TESS BRIDGEMAN, REISS CTR. ON L. & SEC., WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
REPORTING: PRESIDENTIAL PRACTICE AND THE USE OF ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1973-2019, 1617 (2020), https://warpowers.lawandsecurity.org/wpr-reporting-1973-2019.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9FX5-ARWL].
52. For a discussion of a much larger pattern in which Congress is generally hesitant to
exercise strong oversight over military operations, instead focusing on oversight over administrative military matters such as acquisitions, training, and equipping, see Mark Patrick
Nevitt, The Operational and Administrative Militaries, 53 GA. L. REV. 905, 938-49 (2019).
53. Trevor W. Morrison, “Hostilities,” 1 J.L. (1 PUB. L. MISC.) 233, 236 (2011); Oona A.
Hathaway, How to Revive Congress’ War Powers, in POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, TEX. NAT’L SEC. REV. 41, 43-50 (Nov. 14, 2019), https://tnsr.org/roundtable/
policy-roundtable-the-war-powers-resolution/ [https://perma.cc/MRQ9-FLSX].
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the WPR’s legislative history suggests that Congress intended
“hostilities” to be a broad term,54 Presidents have interpreted it
narrowly to avoid reporting requirements and triggering its withdrawal provisions.55 In 2011, for example, as the WPR sixty-day
termination date for U.S. military operations in Libya neared, the
Obama administration concluded that U.S. military operations did
not constitute “hostilities” within the meaning of the WPR even
though the United States had already conducted an extensive
bombing campaign.56 The Trump administration subsequently
adopted a similar position on “limited” hostilities in Syria.57 And in
Yemen, President Trump argued that U.S. military operations in
support of the Saudi-led coalition did not amount to “hostilities,” as
U.S. troops served only in a noncombat support role, despite a
resolution supported by both houses of Congress specifically labeling the operations “hostilities.”58
The executive branch’s narrow interpretation of the WPR has
cabined its scope and thus limited the foreign relations committees’ ability to exercise their intended oversight role. As one
54. H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 7 (1973) ( “[H]ostilities was substituted for the phrase armed
conflict during the subcommittee drafting process because it was considered to be somewhat
broader in scope.... [H]ostilities also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots
have been fired but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict.”).
55. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jean Galbraith, Presidential War Powers as an Interactive
Dynamic: International Law, Domestic Law, and Practice-Based Legal Change, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 689, 697 (2016); Chesney, supra note 11, at 612; Hathaway, supra note 53, at 43-50.
56. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rels., 112th Cong. 7-9
(2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State); UNITED STATES
ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA 25 (2011), in Letter from Joseph E. Macmanus, Acting Assistant Sec’y,
Legis. Affs., Dep’t of State & Elizabeth L. King, Assistant Sec’y, Legis. Affs., Dep’t of Def., to
Hon. John A. Boehner, Speaker, House of Representatives (June 15, 2011), https://fas.org/
man/eprint/wh-libya.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5E2-DE9A].
57. See Memorandum Opinion from Steven A. Engel, Off. of Legal Couns., to the Couns.
to the President, April 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chemical-Weapons Facilities (May 31,
2018).
58. S.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. (2019). The resolution was vetoed by President Trump.
Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval Legislation Regarding the Removal of
United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in Yemen, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Apr.
16, 2019). Congress has repeatedly considered revisions to the War Powers Resolution to
address the problems outlined in this Section, but it has yet to implement any changes. See,
e.g., Reclaiming Congressional War Powers: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs.,
117th Cong. (2021), https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/2021/3/reclaiming-congressional-warpowers [https://perma.cc/8YX8-QUQ9]; War Powers Reform Resolution, S.J. Res. 60, 116th
Cong. (2019); War Powers Reform Resolution, H.J. Res. 83, 116th Cong. (2020); War Powers
Reform Act, H.R. 383, 113th Cong. (2013).
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congressional staffer explained, “The foreign relations committees
never managed to have the hook they should have had through the
War Powers Resolution. They used it as a rhetorical cudgel rather
than as an operative means to have a seat at the decision-making
table.”59 As modern warfare tactics have increasingly fallen outside
the WPR’s scope,60 the foreign relations committees have been increasingly sidelined. As discussed in the next two Sections, much of
that oversight authority has instead gone to the armed services and
intelligence committees.
B. The Armed Services Committees
In the mid-twentieth century, in response to the immense growth
in U.S. power and influence abroad, Congress took its first major
steps to institute a statutory framework for authorizing and
overseeing U.S. military activities.61 After World War II, Congress
enacted the National Security Act of 1947 to restructure the country’s foreign policy, military, and intelligence establishments.62
Among many other significant structural changes, the National
Security Act reorganized military authorities under a single Department of Defense (DOD), with its organization and functions
primarily codified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.63
Created in 1946, SASC and HASC were charged with “exercis[ing]
continuous watchfulness” over this new Defense Department and
its programs and authorizations.64 SASC exercises jurisdiction over
the DOD and the service branches and “stud[ies] and review[s], on
a comprehensive basis, matters relating to the common defense

59. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4 (Jan. 19, 2021).
60. See infra Part II.A; see also Eric Talbot Jensen, Future War and the War Powers
Resolution, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499, 535-43 (2015).
61. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 584-86.
62. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495.
63. 10 U.S.C. §§ 101-18505. See generally OFF. OF SEC’Y OF DEF., THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE: DOCUMENTS ON ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANIZATION 1944-1978, v-vi, 35-36, 40-45
(1978), https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/other/DODDocsEstandOrg19441978.pdf [https://perma.cc/52KD-R723].
64. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 136, 60 Stat. 812, 832
(1946); see James M. Lindsay, Congressional Oversight of the Department of Defense:
Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom, 17 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 7, 9 (1990).
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policy of the United States.”65 HASC exercises similar jurisdiction
over the DOD and the “[c]ommon defense generally,”66 including the
“laws, programs, and agencies under ... [T]itle 10.”67
DOD activities conducted under Title 10 are subject to the armed
services committees’ oversight.68 Title 10 also contains more than
300 reporting requirements to be made to Congress, ranging from
spending breakdowns to readiness assessments and strategy reports.69 Congressional oversight thus spans fiscal and budgetary
issues, management and performance, and policy and strategy.70
One significant means by which the armed services committees exercise oversight is the annual National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA), which “establishes or continues defense programs, policies,
projects, or activities at DOD and other federal agencies, and
provides guidance on how the appropriated funds are to be used in
carrying out those authorized activities.”71
As we shall see in Part II, the armed services committees have
been able to use their control over the “must pass” NDAA to fill
oversight gaps and in the process have granted themselves greater oversight roles over potentially multi-jurisdictional modern
65. SENATE RULES, supra note 35, R. XXV(c)(1)-(2) at 19-20.
66. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 116TH CONG., R. X(1)(c)(2)-(8), 6 (2019),
https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House-RulesClerk.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA4M-NJ2Y] [hereinafter HOUSE RULES].
67. H. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 116TH CONG., OVERSIGHT PLAN FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS
3, https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/b/2/b236a61e-6d45-40cd-9ad8-bc99b83dfa3b/
AE1FC7A607C9432146B32AF84E99181B.hasc-oversight-plan-for-the-116th-congress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZH82-9TD7].
68. Wall, supra note 11, at 102. Nine Department of Defense elements—the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA); the National Security Agency (NSA); the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA); the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and intelligence
elements of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Space Force—are conducted under
Title 50 authority and therefore fall under the intelligence committees’ jurisdiction.
69. CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPORTS TO BE MADE TO CONGRESS,
H.R. DOC. NO. 116-85, at 1, 28, 31, 83 (2020).
70. See, e.g., Lindsay Wise, House Passes War Powers Resolution Limiting President’s
Ability to Strike Iran, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 11, 2020, 6:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
house-passes-war-powers-resolution-limiting-presidents-ability-to-strike-iran-11583961365
[https://perma.cc/CP5F-BM23]. In addition to formal oversight channels through hearings,
members of Congress also exercise oversight through unofficial communications about defense
programs and consideration of legislation. See id.
71. BRENDAN W. MCGARRY & VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10516, DEFENSE PRIMER: NAVIGATING THE NDAA (2021). See infra Part II for more analysis on the role
of the NDAA.
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warfare.72 Their control over this annual authorization process also
ensures that the DOD is generally quite responsive to the armed
services committees’ requests—and even protective of the committees’ jurisdiction. In fact, the DOD sometimes resists efforts by other committees to request briefings on matters that fall within HASC
and SASC jurisdictions, both to guard against multiple overseers
and to avoid angering the committees to which they are most directly beholden. As one former staff member put it, “DOD’s position
is that we talk to HASC and HAC-D [House Appropriations Defense
Subcommittee] because that’s who controls our money and conducts
our oversight.”73 Thus, as the foreign relations committees’ influence
over modern warfare has declined over the course of the last several
decades, the armed services committees’ influence has continued to
grow.
C. The Intelligence Committees
The intelligence committees are the most recent additions to the
national security committee system.74 They were initially created in
response to a crisis: in late 1974, the New York Times published a
series of devastating articles that exposed covert CIA operations
infiltrating antiwar student protests,75 interfering with foreign
elections,76 and opening mail from the Soviet Union to the United

72. See infra Part II.
73. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
74. See Loch K. Johnson, The Contemporary Presidency: Presidents, Lawmakers, and
Spies: Intelligence Accountability in the United States, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 828, 830
(2004).
75. Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces,
Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/
12/22/archives/huge-cia-operation-reported-in-u-s-against-antiwar-forces-other.html [https://
perma.cc/Y5HG-U9SH] [hereinafter Hersh, C.I.A. Operation]; Seymour M. Hersh, Helms
Disavows “Illegal” Spying by the C.I.A. in U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 1974), https://www.
nytimes.com/1974/12/25/archives/helms-disavows-illegal-spying-by-the-cia-in-us-special-tothe-new.html [https://perma.cc/KS6Q-RCC7]; Seymour M. Hersh, Underground for the C.I.A.
in New York: An Ex-Agent Tells of Spying on Students, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29, 1974), https://
www.nytimes.com/1974/12/29/archives/underground-for-the-cia-in-new-york-an-exagent-tellsof-spying-on.html [https://perma.cc/B5ZS-J9KK].
76. Seymour M. Hersh, C.I.A. Said to Have Asked Funds for Chile Rightists in ‘75, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 1974), https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/21/archives/cia-said-to-have-askedfunds-for-chile-rightists-in-73-a.html [https://perma.cc/M4LU-UWF9].
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States.77 Revelations mounted that the CIA was domestically spying on U.S. citizens in violation of its own charter.78 In December
1974, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan Amendment,79 which “provided the first statutory basis for notification to Congress and congressional oversight of covert action operations.”80 In early 1975, the
Senate created the Church Committee,81 and the House created the
Pike Committee to investigate intelligence abuses.82 Their reports
cemented the view that there needed to be permanent oversight
over the intelligence agencies, prompting Congress to establish
HPSCI and SSCI.83
At the time, members of Congress raised concerns about overlapping jurisdictions and information sharing across committees.
Senator Walter Mondale explained that “[r]esponsibility and authority are fragmented in several committees,” making it “impossible to look at intelligence as a whole.”84 The select committees were
designed to include at least one member from each of the appropriations, armed services, judiciary, and foreign affairs/relations

77. Hersh, C.I.A. Operation, supra note 75.
78. The CIA’s domestic spying activities were aptly abbreviated as “Operation CHAOS.”
See BRIAN FREEMANTLE, CIA 122 (1983). For an overview of Operation CHAOS, see Halkin
v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 982-84 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
79. Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, 88 Stat. 1804 (1974) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 3093) (prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for covert actions
unless the President makes a “finding” that those actions are important to U.S. national
security interests and has submitted that finding to the six appropriate committees, which
were later expanded to the “Gang of Eight,” in a timely manner); see infra note 100 and
accompanying text.
80. MICHAEL E. DEVINE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45175, COVERT ACTION AND CLANDESTINE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: SELECTED DEFINITIONS IN BRIEF 2 (2019).
81. Thomas Young, 40 Years Ago, Church Committee Investigated Americans Spying on
Americans, BROOKINGS INST. (May 6, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/
2015/05/06/40-years-ago-church-committee-investigated-americans-spying-on-americans
[https://perma.cc/M7YD-8NT7].
82. The White House, the CIA and the Pike Committee, 1975, NAT’L SEC. ARCHIVE (June
2, 2017), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence/2017-06-02/white-house-cia-pikecommittee-1975 [https://perma.cc/23S2-QR6R].
83. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 830. SSCI’s mission is to “make continuing studies of
[U.S.] intelligence activities and programs, ... to submit to the Senate appropriate proposals
for legislation[,] report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities, [and] assure that
such activities are in conformity with the [law].” About the Committee, S. SELECT COMM. ON
INTEL., https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about [https://perma.cc/YGA8-DSR6].
84. FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 45 (1978).
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committees.85 Senator Abraham Ribicoff explained the importance
of dual memberships: “If this is going to work at all, there has to be
comity between the standing committees, the select committee, and
the executive branch of our Government .... It is inconceivable to me
that any intelligence matter would be kept back from the parent
committee.”86 He continued, “It is definitely our intention if there is
any matter of importance involving any other committee ... [that]
the Intelligence Committee [will inform] the Committees on Armed
Services, Foreign Relations, Judiciary, or Appropriations.”87
However, Senator William Taft predicted that individual senators
with dual memberships would face challenges transmitting appropriate information “in light of the provision which requires the
full Select Committee on Intelligence to develop regulations governing such transmittal.”88
Congressional debates especially focused on ensuring that the
armed services and intelligence committees “make every effort to
assist and facilitate the work of the two committees.”89 To promote
information sharing, the two committees issued a Memorandum of
Understanding, agreeing that
[w]here there are questions of joint concern between the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services
Committee, they will be promptly made a matter of consultation
and resolution between the Chairmen of the two Committees,
the full Committees, and the Chiefs of Staffs of both Committees
as may be appropriate.90

Today, congressional rules also mandate that the chair and ranking
member of SASC serve as ex-officio SSCI members.91

85. About the Committee, supra note 83. The SSCI includes one majority and one minority
member from each of these committees. Id. House rules require at least one member from
each committee to serve on the HPSCI. HOUSE RULES, supra note 66, R. X(11)(a)(1) at 14.
86. 122 CONG. REC. 14,171 (1976) (statement of Sen. Abraham Ribicoff).
87. Id. at 14,172.
88. KAISER, supra note 84, at 49.
89. Id. at 60 (quoting Memorandum of Understanding Between the Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
122 CONG. REC. S11,355 (daily ed. July 1, 1976)).
90. Id. at 60-61.
91. About the Committee, supra note 83.
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Despite these efforts to promote coordination and cross-committee
information sharing, HPSCI and SSCI have not lived up to these
aspirations. In 1980, Congress amended the Hughes-Ryan Act with
the Intelligence Oversight Act,92 which required that intelligence
activities be reported to Congress before they are carried out. In exchange for these stronger reporting requirements, the Act reduced
the number of committees the intelligence agencies needed to keep
“fully and currently informed” from eight to two: SSCI and HPSCI.93
Perhaps unintentionally, this narrowing of reporting obligations
helped produce the siloed reporting regime of today, in which intelligence reporting goes to (and largely remains in) HPSCI and
SSCI, and reporting of military operations is largely the province of
HASC and SASC.94
The creation of siloed reporting structures continued with the
1991 Intelligence Authorization Act,95 which emerged in response
to the Iran-Contra affair.96 The Act established the modern covert
action notification requirements.97 Under the law, before carrying
out a covert operation, the President must determine the operation
is “necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the
United States and is important to the national security of the
United States” and set that out in a written finding.98 The law further requires that the executive branch “keep the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all covert
actions which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are
carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of
the United States Government, including significant failures.”99
Under “extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the
92. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-450, 94 Stat. 1975,
1981 (1980) (incorporating relevant provisions of the Intelligence Oversight Act).
93. L. ELAINE HALCHIN & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32525, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ALTERNATIVES 33 & n.95
(2012).
94. See infra Part II.B.2.
95. Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 3093).
96. William E. Conner, Reforming Oversight of Covert Actions After the Iran-Contra Affair:
A Legislative History of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 1991, 32 VA. J. INT’L L. 871,
905 (1992).
97. Codified today at 50 U.S.C. § 3093.
98. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(a).
99. Id. § 3093(b)(1).
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United States,” the President may notify a small group that has
become known as the “Gang of Eight”—the House and Senate
majority and minority leaders as well as the chairs and ranking
members of HPSCI and SSCI.100 According to one congressional
staffer interviewed, the executive has increasingly reported activities only to the Gang of Eight, causing other HPSCI and SSCI
members to feel that they are too often kept in the dark.101 Moreover, very few, if any, staff are included in such briefings.102
Importantly, the statutory language excludes “traditional diplomatic or military activities or routine support to such activities”
from these reporting requirements.103 This provision exempts
operations that are essentially military in nature (and thus subject
to their own reporting requirements under Title 10) from intelligence oversight. In other words, Congress established two distinct
categories of reporting based on formalistic, technical designations:
intelligence operations, which are reported under Title 50 to HPSCI
and SSCI (even when implemented by the DOD) and “traditional
military activities” (TMA), which are reported under Title 10 to
HASC and SASC (even when implemented by an intelligence
agency).104 This distinction laid the foundation for the information
silos plaguing cyber and other forms of modern warfare.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MODERN WARFARE
Part I described the congressional committee structure for military and intelligence operations. While each set of committees has
a clear jurisdictional mandate, modern warfare has increasingly
blurred the lines between them. In particular, as warfare has
evolved in the post-9/11 era, a number of operations have emerged
at the intersection of Title 10 and Title 50 authorities. These
100. Id. § 3093(c). The Intelligence Conference Committee conferees specified at the time
that “extraordinary circumstances” includes circumstances in which “the President is faced
with a covert action of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of the
covert action should be restricted to as few individuals as possible.” MARSHALL CURTIS ERWIN,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40691, SENSITIVE COVERT ACTION NOTIFICATIONS: OVERSIGHT OPTIONS
FOR CONGRESS 1-2 (2013).
101. See Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
102. See Interview with Congressional Staff Member #3, supra note 19.
103. 50 U.S.C. § 3093(e)(1)-(4).
104. See Chesney, supra note 11, at 595, 615-16; id. § 3093(e)(2).
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operations could fall under the jurisdiction of multiple committees, or, in some cases, none. This is particularly evident with drone
strikes, special operations, and cyber warfare. In 2013, Congress
began to clarify the lines and fill oversight gaps. But its solution to
the ambiguities and inconsistencies caused by the Title 10-Title 50
convergence was to assign increasing oversight responsibility to
HASC and SASC, often freezing the other committees out of the
oversight process.105 In this Part, we explore how that process unfolded. First, we show how counterterrorism operations in the post9/11 era increasingly blurred the Title 10/Title 50 distinction.
Second, we examine the rise of multi-jurisdictional cyber operations
and Congress’s attempts to fill reporting gaps while reinforcing
jurisdictional boundaries between the committees, thereby impeding truly effective oversight.
A. The Post-9/11 Title 10-Title 50 Convergence in Modern
Warfare
The tripartite committee structure described previously might
work well if the committees had truly distinct jurisdictions. When
military and intelligence operations were more easily disentangled, this structure was reasonably effective. But the set of issues
arising from cross-committee jurisdictions has grown substantially
over the last several decades. As a result, Congress’s organizational
structure has become outdated. In particular, military and covert
action operations have become difficult to distinguish, leading to
the “Title 10-Title 50 convergence.”106 As one congressional staffer
observed, “What consists of a Title 50 operation versus a ... Title 10
operation still isn’t clear.”107 This phenomenon was initially observed in counterterrorism operations, especially with regard to
drone strikes and special forces missions, foreshadowing later
challenges for cyber oversight.
105. As mentioned supra note 33 and accompanying text, there are instances in which
other committees may have a plausible claim to overseeing certain operations. In practice,
however, the vast majority of modern warfare oversight is carried out by the foreign affairs/foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence committees. This Article therefore
focuses on those three committees.
106. See Zoli, supra note 28, at 613-14, 620; Chesney, supra note 11, at 539, 615-16.
107. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
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1. The Rise of Modern Warfare and Its Oversight Challenges
These oversight challenges became particularly apparent in the
wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 9/11 Commission, which was
created to investigate the incident and recommend ways to prevent
future attacks, stressed that executive branch reforms “will not
work if congressional oversight does not change too. Unity of effort
in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by divided
congressional oversight.”108 Calling oversight “dysfunctional,” the
Commission recommended either creating a joint intelligence committee or giving the existing intelligence committees both authorizing and appropriating authorities.109 In short, the Commission
concluded, the outdated committee structure required reform to
address contemporary cross-cutting national security challenges.
Despite these warnings, the problems the Commission identified
only worsened in the years after 9/11. In particular, the convergence
of Title 10 and Title 50 operations accelerated considerably. The
DOD (whose operations are generally authorized under Title 10)
continued to develop its clandestine capabilities for traditional
military activities, while the CIA (whose operations are generally
authorized under Title 50) acquired new lethal capabilities.110 This
convergence was especially evident with respect to operations carried out by special forces and drones. After 9/11, Special Operations
Forces (SOF) became a crucial counterterrorism force. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has more than doubled in size since
2001 and has commandos deployed to nearly 150 countries.111
Likewise, lethal drone strikes have become a central element of the

108. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 420 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8KT7-FFDA] [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION].
109. Id.
110. See Zoli, supra note 28, at 613-14.
111. SOCOM had 33,000 personnel in 2001 and over 70,000 personnel at the start of 2020.
See ANDREW FEICKERT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS21048, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
(SOF): BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1-7 (2021). In 2009, commandos were deployed to sixty countries, and in 2015, it reached a record 147. Daniel Byman & Ian A.
Merritt, The New American Way of War: Special Operations Forces in the War on Terrorism,
41 WASH. Q. 79, 83 (2018).
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U.S. counterterrorism strategy, with one database cataloging over
14,000 strikes from 2010 to 2020.112
Security cooperation efforts, including programs to train, equip,
and otherwise assist foreign defense and security forces, have also
expanded significantly since 9/11.113 Indeed, security cooperation
formed the foundation of the U.S. counter-ISIS policy in Iraq and
Syria,114 and the U.S. government spent over $200 billion on security assistance and security cooperation programs from 2006 to
2018.115 In 2017, Congress authorized security cooperation funds
under Title 10 U.S.C. § 127e to support special operations to combat
terrorism.116 One Green Beret explained, § 127e programs are “less,
112. See Drone Warfare, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.thebu
reauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war [https://perma.cc/B8CS-9W3J].
113. For a more expansive discussion of security cooperation, see NINA M. SERAFINO, CONG.
RSCH. SERV., R44444, SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND COOPERATION: SHARED RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE 4-5 (2016); BOLKO J. SKORUPSKI & NINA M.
SERAFINO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44602, DOD SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OVERVIEW OF
AUTHORITIES AND ISSUES 2 (2016).
114. See Fact Sheet: Strategy to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 10, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/
09/10/fact-sheet-strategy-counter-islamic-state-iraq-and-levant-isil [https://perma.cc/ZP8UZ4K5]; Tanya Somanader, President Obama Provides an Update on Our Strategy to Degrade
and Destroy ISIL, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 6, 2015, 3:10 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/blog/2015/07/06/president-obama-provides-update-our-strategy-degrade-anddestroy-isil [https://perma.cc/XP5B-SB3C]; Bilal Y. Saab, Broken Partnerships: Can
Washington Get Security Cooperation Right?, 42 WASH. Q. 77, 79 (2019). The Trump administration continued this emphasis on security cooperation, maintaining partnerships with over
two hundred countries and international organizations to build a “robust network of allies and
partners—to deter or defeat aggression by major powers,” namely Russia and China. OFF. OF
THE SEC’Y OF DEF., FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2021 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: JUSTIFICATION FOR SECURITY
COOPERATION PROGRAM AND ACTIVITY FUNDING 2 (Apr. 2020), https://comptroller.defense.
gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2021/fy2021_Security_Cooperation_Book_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QC8P-WXVY] [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FY 2021].
115. See SUSAN B. EPSTEIN & LIANA W. ROSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45091, U.S. SECURITY
ASSISTANCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS: OVERVIEW OF FUNDING TRENDS 3
(2018). DOD requested $7.59 billion in FY 2021. PRESIDENT’S BUDGET FY 2021, supra note
114, at 3. DOD requested $9.19 billion in FY 2020 for security cooperation programs and activities. OFF. OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., FISCAL YEAR (FY) 2020 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: JUSTIFICATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAM AND ACTIVITY FUNDING 3 (Mar. 2019),
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/FY2020_Security_
Cooperation_Book_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4RH-99D6].
116. See Wesley Morgan, Behind the Secret U.S. War in Africa, POLITICO (July 2, 2018, 5:08
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/02/secret-war-africa-pentagon-664005 [https://
perma.cc/5K97-S75C]; Tommy Ross, House and Senate Chart Different Courses on US
Clandestine Support of Foreign Militias, JUST SEC. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.
org/72098/house-and-senate-chart-different-courses-on-us-clandestine-support-of-foreign-
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‘We’re helping you,’ and more, ‘You’re doing our bidding.’”117 In 2017,
SOCOM reportedly expended nearly $80 million to resource twentyone programs under the § 127e authority.118
As the role of special forces, drones, and security cooperation has
grown, the oversight gaps caused by the artificial Title 10-Title 50
distinction have become increasingly apparent. One scholar explained, “When the CIA and SOF operate together on the battlefield, the legal distinctions regarding operating authorities and
procedures, and accountability, can become blurred.”119 This can
have far-reaching implications for oversight.120 For example, lethal
operations can be carried out by either the DOD or CIA.121 When led
by the DOD, the operation falls under Title 10 oversight by HASC
and SASC.122 When led by the CIA, even with the same operators, the operation is typically undertaken as a “covert action” and
militias [https://perma.cc/W8ZX-NXVX].
117. Morgan, supra note 6.
118. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 and Oversight of
Previously Authorized Programs: Hearing on Evolution, Transformation, and Sustainment:
A Review and Assessment of the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request for U.S. Special Operations
Forces and Command Before the Subcomm. on Emerging Threats & Capabilities of the H.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 55 (2018) (statement of General Raymond A. Thomas,
III, U.S. Army Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command).
119. Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L. SEC. J.
283, 357 (2011) (quoting KATHRYN STONE, “ALL NECESSARY MEANS”—EMPLOYING CIA
OPERATIVES IN A WARFIGHTING ROLE ALONGSIDE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 15 (2003)).
120. Id.
121. Initially, targeted killings were conducted largely by the CIA, but the Obama administration sought to transfer this authority to the military. See Robert Chesney, A Revived CIA
Drone Strike Program? Comments on the New Policy, LAWFARE (Mar. 14, 2017, 12:12 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/revived-cia-drone-strike-program-comments-new-policy [https://
perma.cc/8LJU-HC9F]. It is not clear, however, to what extent these authorities fully shifted,
with some reporters claiming the DOD and CIA instead employed a hybrid approach, such as
by detailing Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) personnel to the CIA or vice versa.
See Gordon Lubold & Shane Harris, Trump Broadens CIA Powers, Allows Deadly Drone
Strikes, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2017, 6:32 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-gave-ciapower-to-launch-drone-strikes-1489444374 [https://perma.cc/PJQ2-2FRG]; Greg Miller,
Obama’s New Drone Policy Leaves Room for CIA Role, WASH. POST (May 25, 2013), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obamas-new-drone-policy-has-cause-forconcern/2013/05/25/0daad8be-c480-11e2-914f-a7aba60512a7_story.html?utm_term=.
ef7d051e0b78 [https://perma.cc/3D7Y-LLJU]. The Trump administration expanded the CIA’s
role and responsibilities in legal strike operations and eliminated several executive branch
reporting requirements. See Shannon Dick & Rachel Stohl, U.S. Drone Policy: Transparency
& Oversight, STIMSON (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.stimson.org/2020/u-s-drone-policy [https://
perma.cc/4LKK-29D9]; Atherton, supra note 32.
122. See 10 U.S.C. § 127e.
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subject to extensive but highly classified reporting to HPSCI and
SSCI under 50 U.S.C. § 3093.123 For example, the raid that killed
Osama bin Laden was executed by U.S. Navy Seals from Joint
Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the DOD.124 However, it
was classified as a Title 50 operation under the “command” of the
CIA director.125 Because it was considered a CIA operation, only the
Gang of Eight—which includes HPSCI and SSCI leadership as well
as the House and Senate leadership—was informed. The armed
services and foreign relations committees, however, were not.126
Section 127e programs and activities present further oversight
challenges. While § 127e includes reporting requirements,127 these
operations often elude effective oversight. They are typically highly
classified and briefed only to a narrow group of congressional members and staff. Former congressional staffer Tommy Ross explained,
“Policymakers and congressional staffers who work in areas likely
to be most affected by 127e operations—traditional foreign assistance and diplomacy activities, for example—are generally not
included among those briefed .... limiting accountability and profoundly challenging the government’s ability to plan, coordinate,
and integrate comprehensive assistance packages.”128 Even within
a single committee, only a few members are typically notified of
sensitive operations, and staff are sometimes excluded altogether.129
Moreover, similar and sometimes overlapping training and assistance programs can be operated by the CIA, which follows its own
distinct reporting regime.130 For example, the CIA reportedly spent
over $1 billion over four years on a covert action program to support
Syrian rebels.131 This program reportedly operated alongside an
123. See LARRY LEWIS & DIANE VAVRICHEK, RETHINKING THE DRONE WAR 210-11 (2016),
https://fas.org/man/eprint/drone-war.pdf [https://perma.cc/8M9T-28Z8].
124. Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, NEW YORKER (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.new
yorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/getting-bin-laden [https://perma.cc/F5PW-K25B].
125. See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41809, OSAMA BIN LADEN’S DEATH:
IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 1, 1 (2011).
126. See id.
127. 10 U.S.C. § 127e(d)(1), (h)(3).
128. Ross, supra note 116; see also MARTHA LEE, ALEXANDRA SCHMITT, & GABRIELLE TARINI,
PARTNERING TO PROTECT 63 (2019).
129. See Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
130. See LEWIS & VAVRICHEK, supra note 123, at 210-11.
131. See Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman & Michael S. Schmidt, Behind the Sudden Death
of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A War in Syria, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
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overt DOD program authorized and overseen by HASC and SASC.132
The CIA programs would have been reported under Title 50 to
HPSCI and SSCI alone, even though they may have directly
overlapped, and even competed, with programs authorized by HASC
and SASC.133 As one former staffer put it in an interview with us, “I
saw in a couple of cases some of these programs that were not only
duplicative, but competitive. The DOD and CIA were trying to
displace one another from the same landscape.”134
Importantly, special operations, drone strikes, and security cooperation missions often fall outside of the oversight jurisdiction of
HFAC and SFRC under the WPR. As discussed in Part I,135 the
executive branch has often narrowly defined “hostilities” in the
WPR to require “the presence of U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties
or a serious threat thereof.”136 This definition “allows the President
to escape the WPR whenever drones are relied upon—regardless of
the extent of a military campaign involving drones.”137 Under this
contested interpretation of hostilities, the executive branch is not
obligated to report special forces operations, including kill/capture
missions, to Congress under the WPR.138 This interpretation has
largely kept HFAC and SFRC in the dark on the vast majority of
counterterrorism operations.

2017/08/02/world/middleeast/cia-syria-rebel-arm-train-trump.html [https://perma.cc/587EQ2PL].
132. See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & AMY BELASCO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43727, TRAIN
AND EQUIP PROGRAM FOR SYRIA: AUTHORITIES, FUNDING, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 1, 9
(2015).
133. See LEWIS & VAVRICHEK, supra note 123, at 210-11.
134. Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
135. See supra Part I.A.
136. See Benjamin R. Farley, Drones and Democracy: Missing Out on Accountability?, 54
S. TEX. L. REV. 385, 416 (2012).
137. Id. at 417.
138. Many continue to maintain that the “hostilities” bar is not nearly so high and that, at
a minimum, lethal operations that put U.S. troops in harm’s way—including special operations and security cooperation missions—fall under the WPR’s notification requirements.
See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 60, at 535-37.
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2. Congress’s Attempts to Respond to the Challenges of
Modern Warfare
Starting in 2013, Congress began to fill the oversight gaps caused
by the Title 10-Title 50 convergence. HASC and SASC leveraged
the NDAA process to clarify special operations reporting procedures
and consolidate their jurisdiction.139 Through the FY 2014 NDAA
process, Congress defined “sensitive military operation[s]” (SMOs),
now codified under 10 U.S.C. § 130f.140 This statute requires the Secretary of Defense to “promptly” notify the defense committees
(HASC, SASC, House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (HACD), and Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (SAC-D)) of
any “lethal operation or capture operation conducted by the armed
forces ... outside a theater of major hostilities.”141 The Secretary
must also “periodically brief the congressional defense committees
on [DOD] personnel and equipment assigned to sensitive military
operations.”142 Robert Chesney described the statute as “analogous
to the more-familiar oversight system we already have for Title 50
covert action,” observing that “the new SMO oversight architecture
139. See Craig Whitlock, Lawmaker Wants Military to Promptly Alert Congress About
Drone Strikes, WASH. POST (May 8, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/lawmaker-wants-military-to-promptly-alert-congress-about-drone-strikes/2013/
05/08/dcc73068-b817-11e2-bd07-b6e0e6152528_story.html?hpid=z3 [https://perma.cc/M53FEUSW]; Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., Thornberry Bill “Lets Congress Push Back” on Drone Strikes,
Special Ops, BREAKING DEF. (May 13, 2013, 2:50 PM), https://breakingdefense.com/2013/
05/thornberry-bill-lets-congress-push-back-on-drone-strikes-special-ops-not-declared-wars/
[https://perma.cc/N3HK-U9BM].
140. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1041,
127 Stat. 672, 856-57 (2013) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 130f) [hereinafter FY 2014
NDAA].
141. Id. § 1041(a), (d) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 130f(a)). The definition of “sensitive military operation” was updated in subsequent NDAAs. See John S. McCain National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1031(a), 132 Stat.
1636, 1953 (2018) [hereinafter FY 2019 NDAA]; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1036(d), 130 Stat. 2000 (2016) [hereinafter FY 2017 NDAA].
The statute no longer provides that the operation must be “outside a theater of major
hostilities,” but defines a sensitive military operation as “(A) a lethal operation or capture
operation conducted by the armed forces or conducted by a foreign partner in coordination
with the armed forces that targets a specific individual or individuals; or (B) an operation
conducted by the armed forces in self-defense or in defense of foreign partners.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 130f(d)(1). The statute expressly excludes operations in Afghanistan, Syria, or Iraq from the
definition of a sensitive military operation. Id. § 130f(d)(2).
142. Id. § 130f(c).
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helps minimize oversight dropoff when it is JSOC rather than CIA
that is conducting a kill/capture mission outside the ‘hot battlefield’
areas.”143 In short, 10 U.S.C. § 130f minimized the daylight between
oversight over similar operations conducted by the intelligence community and the DOD. In addition to requiring one-off notifications
of SMOs, the FY 2014 NDAA also required quarterly counterterrorism briefings, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 485.144
In the process of remedying the ambiguities and inconsistencies
caused by the Title 10-Title 50 convergence, HASC and SASC also
consolidated their jurisdiction over those operations. The new reporting requirements ended debate over whether these clandestine,
“below the threshold” operations needed to be reported to the foreign
relations committees under the WPR or to the intelligence committees under the covert action statute. Unless conducted as part of
ongoing hostilities, they would be reported only to the armed
services committees.
Congress continued to amend and clarify this reporting structure
over the next six years, creating a complex but relatively robust
oversight regime. While these changes allowed Congress to address
emerging threats and capabilities, they also further entrenched
information silos. For example, the FY 2017 NDAA clarified the
requirement for “prompt” reporting by adding specific deadlines.
The new statute required notification of SMOs to the armed services
committees within forty-eight hours of the operation and “immediate” notification in the event of an unauthorized disclosure.145 The
statute also mandated notification within fourteen days if the DOD
sought to change any reporting procedures. The same NDAA also
addressed a new ambiguity in whether self-defense operations
should be considered SMOs. In multiple out-of-theater countries,
143. Robert Chesney, Expanding Congressional Oversight of Kill/Capture Ops Conducted
by the Military: Section 1036 of the NDAA, LAWFARE (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:25 PM), https://www.law
fareblog.com/expanding-congressional-oversight-killcapture-ops-conducted-military-section1036-ndaa [https://perma.cc/BGJ9-XB2F].
144. FY 2014 NDAA, supra note 140, § 1042. These briefings must outline the DOD’s
“counterterrorism operations and related activities,” including updates on activities within
each geographic combatant command and how they relate to the respective theater campaign
plan, relevant legal authorities and issues, and related interagency initiatives. 10 U.S.C.
§ 485(b)(1)-(3).
145. FY 2017 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1036(a)-(b) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 130f).
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but especially Somalia, the Obama administration had been justifying kinetic strikes as either self-defense or “collective self-defense”
of U.S. partner forces.146 In turn, Congress explicitly expanded the
definition of SMO to include not only kill/capture missions but also
the use of force in self-defense or in defense of foreign partners.147
These amendments, enacted in response to gaps and ambiguities
as they arose, have created an oversight regime that is comprehensive but has consolidated oversight of SMOs under the armed
services committees’ jurisdiction. This has led to a somewhat bizarre
situation in which only the armed services committees receive
reporting on SOCOM-led operations and drone strikes; only the
intelligence committees are notified of parallel operations led by the
CIA; and the foreign relations committees are often not informed of
either type of operation, despite their role in overseeing war powers
reporting, country missions, and diplomatic relations, as well as
authorizing uses of force, all of which can be directly impacted by
such operations.148 One former congressional staff member recalled
that while putting together a “massive Pakistan aid package that
would shift the basis of U.S.-Pakistan relations,” committee members were not read in on the United States’ drone program in the
country.149 Another former congressional staffer explained, “The
siloing issue can be an even bigger problem in the counterterrorism
kinetic world of special forces and CIA operations against terrorists.”150 As we shall see in the next Section, similar coordination
failures plague the cyber oversight regime.

146. Charlie Savage, Eric Schmitt & Mark Mazzetti, Obama Expands War with Al Qaeda
to Include Shabab in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/
27/us/politics/obama-expands-war-with-al-qaeda-to-include-shabab-in-somalia.html [https://
perma.cc/U67B-8QYU] (“Over the past year, the military has routinely invoked a built-in
exception to those rules for airstrikes taken in ‘self-defense,’ which can include strikes to help
foreign partners even when Americans are not at direct risk.”); see also E. L. Gaston,
Reconceptualizing Individual or Unit Self-Defense as a Combatant Privilege, 8 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 283, 328-29 (2017).
147. The same amendment also sought to simplify the definition of SMO. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 130f(d).
148. If the activities are undertaken as part of ongoing hostilities, they would be captured
in 50 U.S.C. § 1543(c) reporting.
149. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
150. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
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Table 1: Key Counterterrorism Operations Oversight
Provisions151
Special Operations, Drone Strikes, and Targeted Killings
Provision
Requirement
Recipient
10 U.S.C. § 485
Monthly briefings by DOD on
HASC; SASC
counterterrorism operations.
10 U.S.C. § 130f
Written notice of “sensitive military
HASC; SASC
operations” within 48 hours of the
operation.
FY 2018 NDAA
Annual report on civilian casualties
HASC; SASC
§ 1057
caused by U.S. military operations.
FY 2020 NDAA
Annual joint report by the Director of
“Congress”
§ 1723
National Intelligence (DNI) and the
Secretary of Defense on strikes against
terrorist targets outside areas of
hostilities, and assessments of
combatant and noncombatant deaths
from those strikes.
10 U.S.C. § 127e
Notification within 15 days, or within HASC; SASC
48 hours if “extraordinary
circumstances ... impact[ ] national
security,” of initiating an operation
that supports “foreign forces, irregular
forces, groups, or individuals engaged
in supporting or facilitating authorized
ongoing military operations by United
States special operations forces to
combat terrorism”; biannual reports on
§ 127e operations.

151. All provisions in Table 1—except 50 U.S.C. § 3093—also require reporting to the
House and Senate appropriations committees.
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50 U.S.C. § 3093

Report a presidential finding
authorizing a covert action before
initiating the operation; keep
committees “fully and currently
informed of all covert actions,”
including significant changes to
previously approved covert action.
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HPSCI; SSCI

B. Congressional Oversight of Cyber Operations
1. Early Responses to the Emerging Cyber Domain
Around the same time that Congress pursued comprehensive reform of oversight over special operations and drone strikes, it began
crafting a legal regime for cyber operations. Like special forces missions and drone strikes, cyber operations blurred the distinction
between Title 10 and Title 50, creating challenges for both Congress
and the White House. Cyber operations, like counterterrorism operations, do not map neatly onto the existing, distinct reporting
requirements under the WPR, the Title 10 regime for traditional
military activities, or the Title 50 covert action statute.
Congress’s initial oversight efforts focused on developing an
understanding of this new domain and the executive branch’s cyber
strategy. The United States’ vulnerability to potentially devastating
cyber operations became increasingly apparent.152 Observers warned
that the United States lacked a strategy for deterring cyber attacks
and deploying offensive cyber capabilities.153 In 2009, the Secretary
152. David E. Sanger, John Markoff & Thom Shanker, U.S. Steps Up Effort on Digital
Defenses, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/28/us/28cyber.html?_
r=2 [https://perma.cc/L3EP-PXB4].
153. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies raised the alarm in
four reports between 2008 and 2011, warning that “America’s failure to protect cyberspace
is one of the most urgent national security problems facing the [Obama] administration.” CTR.
FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 11 (2008),
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/
081208_securingcyberspace_44.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEL9-HEVE]; CTR. FOR STRATEGIC &
INT’L STUD., CYBERSECURITY TWO YEARS LATER 1 (2011) (observing that 2010 alone saw major
cyber-attacks on Google and the DOD, the stuxnet attack on Iranian centrifuges, and denialof-service attacks on Wikileaks), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/
legacy_files/files/publication/110128_Lewis_CybersecurityTwoYearsLater_Web.pdf [https://
perma.cc/ZZH3-NCNZ]; see also Oona A. Hathaway, Rebecca Crootof, Philip Levitz, Haley Niz,
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of Defense established Cyber Command as a subordinate command
under U.S. Strategic Command to elevate cyber operations within
the military and strengthen the Department’s cyber capabilities.154
A year later, Congress directed the Pentagon to submit a report on
its “cyber warfare policy.”155 In its response, the DOD stated that it
would conduct “offensive cyber operations” consistent with the policy
and legal principles governing kinetic capabilities.156 It also made
clear its view that few, if any, cyber operations would trigger the
WPR on their own.157 This meant, of course, that its activities would
remain outside the purview of the foreign relations committees and
solely within the oversight authority of the armed services committees.
While Cyber Command’s efforts to disrupt terrorist organizations
in war zones were relatively uncontroversial, its attempts to carry
out offensive operations beyond active combat zones or areas of
hostilities—such as those that touched networks or servers within
third-party countries—prompted heated debate within the executive
branch about the proper home for these activities.158 Cyber Command argued that these clandestine operations were properly
considered Title 10 “traditional military activities” even if outside
traditional war zones because of the difficulties in defining the
battlespace when it comes to cyber activities.159 Seeking to limit
Cyber Command’s turf, the CIA argued that offensive cyber
operations beyond the battle zone fell under its purview as covert
action—requiring a presidential finding and compliance with Title
Aileen Nowlan, William Perdue & Julia Spiegel, The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
817, 821 (2012) (defining cyber-attack).
154. Memorandum from Off. of Sec’y of Def., Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Establishment of a Subordinate Unified U.S. Cyber Command Under U.S.
Strategic Command for Military Cyberspace Operations (June 23, 2009), https://nsarchive2.
gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-029.pdf [https://perma.cc/62AR-YUJ6].
155. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111383, § 934, 124 Stat. 4338-39 (2011).
156. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBERSPACE POLICY REPORT: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011
5 (2011), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=692701 [https://perma.cc/83U6-LTYG].
157. Id. at 9.
158. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5 (Jan. 21, 2021), supra note 22.
159. Ellen Nakashima, Pentagon’s Cyber Command Seeks Authority to Expand Its
Battlefield, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2010, 12:41 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507304.html [https://perma.cc/Z7J6-MCD4].
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50’s reporting provisions.160 The State Department similarly favored cabining Cyber Command’s authorities, reportedly fearing
diplomatic backlash from affected third-party countries.161
In the FY 2012 NDAA, Congress weighed in on this debate, affirming the DOD’s authority to “conduct offensive operations in
cyberspace to defend our Nation, Allies and interests.”162 In the
conference report, Congress noted the “lack of historical precedent
for what constitutes traditional military activities in relation to
cyber operations,” yet also acknowledged the need “to undertake
offensive military cyber activities, including where the role of the
United States Government is not apparent or to be acknowledged.”163 Congress did not resolve the military activity-covert action
dispute, but it emphasized that cyber operations must be consistent
with the legal and policy regimes for kinetic capabilities.164
As these debates continued, Congress took initial steps to
establish a framework for continuous oversight over cyber operations. SASC had reportedly expressed concerns in early 2011 that
the DOD was not including cyber activities in its quarterly report on
clandestine military activities.165 In the FY 2013 NDAA, Congress
filled this reporting gap by enacting what is today’s most central
cyber reporting requirement: the DOD’s obligation to provide quarterly briefings to the armed services committees “on all offensive
and significant defensive military operations in cyberspace.”166 By
including this provision as part of its efforts to “address[ ] adversarial use of the internet as a new battlespace,” legislators sought
to “maintain[ ] a focus on increasing oversight of cyberspace
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also Chesney, supra note 11, at 627 (arguing that the Title 10-Title 50 debate
in the context of cyber operations not only concerns authorization and reporting requirements,
but also implicates substantive legal issues, such as the protection of sovereignty under
international law).
162. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 954,
125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011) [hereinafter FY 2012 NDAA].
163. H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, at 686 (2011) (Conf. Rep.).
164. FY 2012 NDAA, supra note 162, § 954.
165. Senators Say Military Cyber Ops Not Disclosed, FOX NEWS (Mar. 20, 2015), https://
www.foxnews.com/us/senators-say-military-cyber-ops-not-disclosed.amp [https://perma.cc/
Y6W3-2B5D].
166. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239,
§ 939(a), 126 Stat. 1632, 1888 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 484(a)) [hereinafter FY
2013 NDAA].
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operations, as well as fostering a better understanding of the
challenges facing the Department when operating in cyberspace.”167
This foundational reporting requirement fell exclusively under the
armed services committees’ jurisdiction, laying the foundation for a
recurring trend as cyber oversight requirements evolved.168 According to a former SFRC senior staff member, there was no real effort
to include the foreign relations committees in these quarterly
briefings nor in any intelligence committee briefings on related
matters, despite the foreign relations committees’ jurisdiction over
war powers. Any attempt would have likely been futile, the staff
member explained: “If [HFAC and SFRC] couldn’t get operational
access to military or intelligence operations generally, cyber would
be even harder.”169
2. Filling Gaps While Entrenching Silos
According to a congressional staff member involved in cyber
oversight deliberations at the time, the armed services committees
were initially concerned about preventing Cyber Command from
exceeding its authorities and acting like a “bull in a china shop.”170
However, these concerns turned out to be unwarranted. In the first
few years of its existence, Cyber Command employed a highly
cautious approach to cyber warfare. U.S. military cyber operations
remained relatively limited to theaters of active combat, and fears
that Cyber Command would assume an aggressive cyber posture
without any legal or regulatory constraints did not materialize.171
For several years after Cyber Command’s inception, oversight over
cyber operations thus remained an “academic issue,” the staff
member recalled.172 The DOD’s incomplete efforts at articulating a
cyber strategy, limited proactive operations, and the rapid rise of
cyber adversaries explain why Congress both empowered the DOD
in cyberspace and simultaneously demanded more reporting.
167. H. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., REP. ON H.R. 4310, H.R. REP. NO. 112-479, pt. 1, at 4
(2012) (FY 2013 NDAA).
168. FY 2013 NDAA, supra note 166, § 939(a).
169. See Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
170. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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Over the next several years, the armed services committees
continued to build out the legal framework for cyber operations
through the NDAA with two oversight goals in mind: first, ensuring
that legislators were kept apprised of the executive branch’s cyber
operations; and second, compelling the DOD to articulate a robust
cyber strategy and empowering it to act in cyberspace. Regarding
the former objective, the armed services committees mandated the
DOD disaggregate its reporting by geographic and functional command and include relevant legal authorities and limitations.173 As
Cyber Command matured and the DOD assumed a more proactive
cyber posture, particularly with the advent of its “Defend Forward”
strategy,174 these reporting and notification requirements became
essential to Congress’s efforts to oversee the executive branch. As a
staff member expressed, the “NDAA has had the greatest impact in
terms of enabling the DOD to take a more active role in defending
against cyber intrusions.”175
Congress also leveraged the NDAA process to urge the DOD to
increase engagement in cyberspace. Between 2013 and 2017, in the
wake of a series of high-profile cyber incidents, HASC and SASC
grew increasingly dissatisfied with the DOD’s untransparent and
uncoordinated efforts to deter cyber aggression by adversaries such
as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea.176 Amendments to the
173. See 10 U.S.C. § 484(b)(1)-(2). In addition, the quarterly briefings must also include
related interagency activities under 10 U.S.C. § 484(b)(3) and readiness assessments of DOD
cyber personnel under 10 U.S.C. § 484(b)(4). See Oona A. Hathaway, Tobias Kuehne, Randi
Michel & Nicole Ng, Appendix A: Cyber Operations, https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xh
tml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/BXRA9I [https://perma.cc/Z5RW-2XQZ] [hereinafter Appendix A: Cyber Operations] (online appendix to this Article cross-walking congressional reporting requirements).
174. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
175. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #2 (Oct. 7, 2020).
176. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 112-173, at 480-81 (2012) (FY 2013 NDAA) (dissenting view
complaining that NDAA should have included a call for articulating a strategy); S. REP. NO.
113-44, at 160 (2013) (FY 2014 NDAA) (“The committee has been pressing for a strategy and
doctrine for deterring adversaries from attacking the United States and our allies for years.
The administration has made some progress in this area, producing some elements of such
a strategy, but the depth and breadth of the analysis and explanation of the U.S. posture
needs to be significantly improved.”); S. REP. NO. 114-49, at 264 (2015) (FY 2016 NDAA) (“The
committee is also concerned that failing to impose meaningful consequences on those seeking
to harm the United States through the cyber domain will embolden our adversaries and lead
to more severe attacks in the future.”); S. REP. NO. 115-125, at 296 (2017) (FY 2018 NDAA)
(“The committee recommends a provision that would establish the policy of the United States
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NDAA expressly required the executive branch to articulate its
“policy to deter adversaries in cyberspace.”177 During the FY 2017
NDAA drafting process, SASC expressed that DOD policy reports
were delayed and inadequate.178 The next year, the FY 2018 NDAA
imposed a spending restriction on DOD funds until submission of a
national policy on cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare.179
Importantly, the President was required to transmit this report—and a subsequent report required by the FY 2019 NDAA—not
only to the armed services committees, but also to the foreign
relations, judiciary, and homeland security committees.180 Congress
also required the executive branch to conduct an interagency cyber
posture review for the next five to ten years to “clarify” U.S. cyber
deterrence “policy and strategy,”181 which later became a quadrennial requirement.182
As the DOD’s cyber capabilities expanded and the possibility that
operations would be conducted outside of areas of active hostilities
grew, Congress concluded that it needed more prompt and active reporting on the DOD’s military cyber activities.183 Congress therefore
supplemented the quarterly briefing requirement for cyber operations, establishing the most significant reporting requirements for
cyber operations to date.184 Through the FY 2018 NDAA, Congress
with respect to matters pertaining to cyberspace, cybersecurity, and cyber warfare. The
committee has long expressed its concern with the lack of an effective strategy and policy for
addressing cyber threats and cyber deterrence.”).
177. FY 2014 NDAA, supra note 140, § 941; see also National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1646, 129 Stat. 726, 1117-18 (2015) [hereinafter
FY 2016 NDAA]; FY NDAA 2017, supra note 141, § 1654; National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1633, 131 Stat. 1283, 1738-39 (2017) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 130g) [hereinafter FY 2018 NDAA].
178. See S. REP. NO. 114-255, at 349 (2016) (criticizing the cyber deterrence policy report
required by § 941 of the FY 2014 NDAA for “disappointingly repackag[ing] the same rhetoric
and recycl[ing] the same pronouncements that have failed to impose any consequences on
those seeking to undermine the national security of the United States in cyberspace”).
179. See FY 2018 NDAA, supra note 177, § 1633(c)(1) (withholding 40 percent of funds for
the Defense Information Systems Agency until the submission of the report).
180. See id. § 1633; FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1636. Only the 2019 report was
required to be transmitted to the intelligence committees.
181. See FY 2018 NDAA, supra note 177, § 1644.
182. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92,
§ 1635, 133 Stat. 1198, 1748 (2019) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 394) [hereinafter FY
2020 NDAA].
183. See id.
184. See Press Release, Rep. Jim Langevin (D-RI), House of Representatives, Langevin,
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created a specific notification regime.185 To stay informed of armed
forces operations that were “intended to cause cyber effects outside
a geographic location” of U.S. hostilities (as defined by the WPR),186
Congress required the Secretary of Defense to notify HASC and
SASC within forty-eight hours of any “sensitive military cyber
operation” (SMCO).187 This included both offensive and defensive
cyber operations.188 The reporting regime, codified today at 10
U.S.C. § 395, exempted covert action and cyber operations conducted in areas of active hostilities (for example, Iraq, Syria, and
Afghanistan) and mirrored the SMO notification and reporting
regime that Congress had instituted four years prior for special
operations forces.189 As HASC ranking member Adam Smith explained, the framework drew on “lessons ... learned from the
oversight of more traditional DOD sensitive activities outside of
areas of active hostilities” to “establish clear standards, processes,
and procedures for notification to Congress of sensitive operations.”190 The FY 2018 NDAA also established a forty-eight-hour
notification requirement for “[t]he use as a weapon of any cyber capability” approved under international law, as well as a quarterly
reporting on the DOD’s weapons review process for cyber weapons.191 This reporting, too, went only to the armed services committees.192

Smith, Thornberry, and Stefanik Introduce Bipartisan Cyber Legislation (June 8, 2017),
https://langevin.house.gov/press-release/langevin-smith-thornberry-and-stefanik-introducebipartisan-cyber-legislation [https://perma.cc/8339-PYRY].
185. See FY 2018 NDAA, supra note 177, § 1631(a) (initially codified at 10 U.S.C. § 130j,
then renumbered as 10 U.S.C. § 395); see also Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173.
186. 10 U.S.C. § 395(c)(1)(A)-(B).
187. Id. § 395(b)(3).
188. Id. § 395. One item that was relieved of the forty-eight-hour reporting requirement
was DOD-internal legal reviews of whether to use a cyber capability as a novel weapon. See
id. § 396(a)(1). “[R]ecogniz[ing] that providing Congress with each individual legal review of
a cyber capability intended for use as a weapon could become[ ] burdensome,” the Senate and
House committees agreed to require aggregate reports every quarter. H.R. REP. NO. 115-404,
at 1017 (2017) (Conf. Rep.) (FY 2018 NDAA). The provision is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1).
However, the postapproval use of such a capability must be reported within forty-eight hours.
See id. § 396(a)(2). Training exercises and covert actions are exempted. See id. § 396(c).
189. See supra Part II.A.2.
190. See Press Release, supra note 184.
191. FY 2018 NDAA, supra note 177, § 1631 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 130k).
192. Id.
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The next year, Congress made even more consequential changes.
The FY 2019 NDAA attempted to resolve the Title 10-Title 50 debate and remove bureaucratic hurdles that had hampered Cyber
Command’s operations.193 These reforms came in the wake of Russia’s use of information and cyber operations during the 2016
election and in the run up to the 2018 midterms, which prompted
widespread frustration over Cyber Command’s perceived limited
ability to deter adversaries.194 As the FY 2019 NDAA conference
report explained, the DOD “routinely confronted” the challenge of
deciding whether “clandestine military activities” were “traditional
military activities” or “covert actions requiring a presidential
finding” under Title 50.195 Thus, before taking any clandestine action outside combat zones, Cyber Command had to “tease out why
cyber operations were [traditional military activities].”196 This
limited the DOD to “actions that could be conducted overtly on
attributable infrastructure without deniability—an operational
space that is far too narrow to defend national interests.”197
Moreover, Presidential Policy Directive-20 (PPD-20), issued by
President Obama, required interagency review and approval for any
offensive cyber operation to manage any collateral consequences,
such as interference with intelligence activities.198 Congress criticized PPD-20 for causing “the executive branch to ha[ve] squandered years in interagency deliberations.”199
Congress attempted a legislative fix through the FY 2019 NDAA.
As a congressional staff member recalled, “Congress has been one
of the most active in pushing [the DOD] to include a more offensive
approach ... we wanted to make sure the Department had the authorities to go out and do those activities.”200 Thus, § 1632 made it
193. See FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1631 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 394(c),
(f)).
194. See Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
195. H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 1049 (2018) (Conf. Rep.) (FY 2019 NDAA).
196. Interview with U.S. Department of Defense Lawyer (Jan. 14, 2021).
197. H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 1049 (2018) (Conf. Rep.) (FY 2019 NDAA).
198. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to Vice President et al. 9 (Oct. 2012),
https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L7G-SXSF] (detailing President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 20 (PPD-20)).
199. H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 1049 (2018) (Conf. Rep.).
200. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #2, supra note 175; see also Loch K.
Johnson, The Church Committee Investigation of 1975 and the Evolution of Modern
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emphatically clear that clandestine cyber military activities,201
including operations “short of hostilities” or generating effects outside areas of hostilities, fall under the traditional military activities
exception to covert action and are thus exclusively subject to Title
10 oversight by the armed services committees.202 Thus, even cyber
operations conducted in secrecy without public acknowledgement
were defined as TMA, allowing Cyber Command to pursue deniable
operations without the more demanding Title 50 covert action
requirements. In the words of a congressional staff member, § 1632
“was an explicit repudiation of objections that other agencies and
departments had always put up to challenge DOD conducting operations in cyberspace.”203 Section 1632 effectively closed the door
on arguments that the intelligence committees should exercise
oversight over clandestine cyber operations.
To resolve any doubt about the DOD’s authorities and urge a response to “continuous aggression” by adversaries, Congress also expressly authorized cyber operations against Russia, China, North
Korea, and Iran.204 Section 1642 of the FY 2019 NDAA provided that
in response to an “active, systematic, and ongoing campaign of attacks ... including attempting to influence American elections and
democratic political processes” by any one of these countries, the
National Command Authority (that is, the President and the Secretary of Defense) could authorize the Secretary of Defense via
Cyber Command “to take appropriate and proportional action in
Intelligence Accountability, 23 INTEL. & NAT’L SEC. 198, 217 (2008) (describing the armed
services committees as taking on a “cheerleading role” in overseeing the DOD’s cyber operations).
201. Section 1632(f) defines a “clandestine military activity or operation in cyberspace” as
one that
(A) is marked by, held in, or conducted with secrecy, where the intent is that the
activity or operation will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly; and “(B) is
to be carried out—“(i) as part of a military operation plan approved by the
President or the Secretary in anticipation of hostilities or as directed by the
President or the Secretary; “(ii) to deter, safeguard, or defend against attacks or
malicious cyber activities against the United States or Department of Defense
information, networks, systems, installations, facilities, or other assets; or “(iii)
in support of information related capabilities.
FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1632(f)(1).
202. FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, §§ 1631(b), 1632 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 394(c), (f) (2020)).
203. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
204. H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 1055 (2018) (Conf. Rep.).
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foreign cyberspace to disrupt, defeat, and deter such attacks ... as
traditional military activities.”205
Observers have called § 1642 a “mini-cyber AUMF.”206 However,
the NDAA requires routine reporting of these operations (notification under 10 U.S.C. § 395 and quarterly briefings) only to the
armed services committees, excluding the foreign relations committees, which have jurisdiction over AUMFs.207 Indeed, because the
provision was included in the NDAA, the foreign relations committees were excluded from its drafting—again, even though AUMFs
formally fall within their exclusive jurisdiction.208 There was,
however, a modest nod in the new legislation to the interests of the
foreign relations committees and intelligence committees: the DOD
is required to submit an annual report concerning cyber attacks by
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran to the foreign affairs,
intelligence, and armed services committees, as well as “adjustments of the Department of Defense in the response directed or
recommended by the Secretary.”209
Congress’s efforts complemented parallel changes in the executive branch’s approach to cyber operations. In September 2018, the
DOD publicly announced “Defend Forward,”210 a strategy involving
persistently engaging adversaries outside of the DOD’s own networks by “impos[ing] tactical friction and strategic costs on our
adversaries” closer to their home networks.211 In other words, Cyber
Command began to more proactively target adversaries’ computer
205. FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1642(a)(1).
206. See Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA,
LAWFARE (July 26, 2018, 2:07 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-opera
tions-and-new-ndaa [https://perma.cc/5K2B-2DWL].
207. FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1642(a)(2); see also supra notes 44-47 and
accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
209. FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141, § 1642(c); see also Appendix A: Cyber Operations,
supra note 173. The Act also makes clear that nothing in the new legislation “may be
construed to ... affect the War Powers Resolution.” FY 2019 NDAA, supra note 141,
§ 1642(d)(2).
210. Mark Pomerleau, Here’s How Cyber Command is Using “Defend Forward,” FIFTH
DOMAIN (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.fifthdomain.com/smr/cybercon/2019/11/12/heres-howcyber-command-is-using-defend-forward [https://perma.cc/KS2D-VD9Y].
211. ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN CYBERSPACE SUPERIORITY: COMMAND VISION FOR U.S. CYBER
COMMAND 6 (2018); see also Gary Corn, SolarWinds is Bad, But Retreat From Defend Forward
Would Be Worse, LAWFARE (Jan. 14, 2021, 11:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/solar
winds-bad-retreat-defend-forward-would-be-worse [https://perma.cc/QRU8-JCJN].
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networks, hunting for and disrupting planned malicious activity, attempting “to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source.”212
To operationalize this strategy, President Trump issued National
Security Presidential Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13), which replaced
PPD-20 and the interagency process that Congress had excoriated,
creating a streamlined approval process for cyber missions.213 On
Election Day in 2018, for example, Cyber Command used these new
authorities to cut off the internet access of the Kremlin-linked
Internet Research Agency, a Russian troll factory that had targeted
the 2016 election.214
Despite significantly updating the authorization process for cyber operations in the White House, NSPM-13 was highly classified,
and the White House refused to share the document with any
member of Congress.215 In a letter to President Trump in February
2019, a bipartisan group of HASC members expressed concern over
the withholding of NSPM-13.216 Noting that “it is unacceptable that
the White House continues to stonewall [Congress’s] attempts to
oversee sensitive operations,” Representative Langevin introduced
an amendment to the FY 2020 NDAA that would have required disclosure of NSPM-13.217 While the amendment ultimately did not
pass, Congress enacted a provision in the FY 2020 NDAA requiring
212. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SUMMARY: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CYBER STRATEGY 2018 1
(2018).
213. See Dustin Volz, Trump, Seeking to Relax Rules on U.S. Cyberattacks, Reverses Obama
Directive, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2018, 11:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-seekingto-relax-rules-on-u-s-cyberattacks-reverses-obama-directive-1534378721 [https://perma.cc/
WA3A-KF4R].
214. See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of
Russian Troll Factory on Day of 2018 Midterms, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2019, 8:22 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disruptedinternet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d611e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html [https://perma.cc/5D6H-9UCN].
215. Mark Pomerleau, After Tug-of-War, White House Shows Cyber Memo to Congress,
FIFTH DOMAIN (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.fifthdomain.com/congress/2020/03/13/after-tug-ofwar-white-house-shows-cyber-memo-to-congress [https://perma.cc/YA5C-M4AV].
216. Letter from the H. Comm. on Armed Servs. to Donald J. Trump, President of the
United States (Feb. 28, 2019), https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/cyber0710.pdf?
mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/2VFG-V7B9].
217. See Press Release, Rep. Jim Langevin (D-RI), House of Representatives, Langevin
Statement on Trump Administration’s Refusal to Provide Congress with Cyberspace
Operations Directive (July 10, 2019), https://langevin.house.gov/press-release/langevinstatement-trump-administrations-refusal-provide-congress-cyberspace [https://perma.cc/
6WZZ-YLHQ].
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the Secretary of Defense to notify HASC and SASC of any delegation of authority from the National Command Authority, including
operational details,218 to ensure transparency over where cyber
authorities reside.219 Only in March 2020 did the White House share
NSPM-13 with Congress,220 although the document remains inaccessible to members who have not received the necessary security
clearance.221
The Trump administration’s secrecy prompted concerns that the
DOD was increasingly keeping Congress in the dark about its cyber
operations.222 Under the new authorities granted to it in 2018, according to some reports, Cyber Command “conducted many more
operations.”223 For example, in June 2019, during a period of escalating incidents with Iran that included the downing of an American drone, the United States conducted an offensive cyber operation
against an Iranian intelligence group in lieu of a military strike.224
In the FY 2020 NDAA, Congress updated the sensitive military
cyber operations notification requirement to bolster oversight, providing more specificity on operations that are “sensitive” and must
be reported.225 The HASC report noted that “the Department’s definition of and threshold for sensitive military cyber operations is not
aligned with the intent of the committee” and expressed its expectation “to be continually notified and kept fully and currently
informed,” suggesting that HASC was dissatisfied with the frequency and lack of detail of the DOD’s reports.226 Accordingly, the
FY 2020 NDAA added a series of specific risk thresholds and triggers for notification, including a medium to high risk of collateral
218. FY 2020 NDAA, supra note 182, § 1642(a)(1).
219. Interview with Department of Defense Lawyer, supra note 196.
220. Pomerleau, supra note 215.
221. See National Security Presidential Memoranda [NSPMs], Donald J. Trump Administration, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspm/index.html [https://perma.
cc/KF4Q-WVAS] (listing NSPM-13, but not providing a public link).
222. See Volz, supra note 213.
223. Mark Pomerleau, New Authorities Mean Lots of New Missions at Cyber Command,
FIFTH DOMAIN (May 8, 2019), https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/cybercom/2019/05/08/newauthorities-mean-lots-of-new-missions-at-cyber-command [https://perma.cc/MBU5-MFMT].
224. Julian E. Barnes & Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.S. Carried Out Cyberattacks on Iran,
N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/us/politics/us-iran-cyberattacks.html [https://perma.cc/M8C9-78Z2].
225. See FY 2020 NDAA, supra note 182, § 1632.
226. H.R. REP. NO. 116-120, at 300 (2019).
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effects (estimated or actual), intelligence gain or loss, probability of
retaliation, or probability of unintended detection.227 Although these
parameters were intended to facilitate greater compliance with the
statute, Chesney has pointed out that there was “some play in the
joints when it comes to distinguishing low from medium risk,” and
that thresholds could “be construed too broadly in some cases” to
frustrate oversight.228 Similarly, the FY 2020 NDAA also required
the DOD to submit to HASC and SASC a written annual report
“summarizing all named military cyber operations,” including both
“cyber effects[ ] operations” and “cyber effects enabling operations,”
although the NDAA and its legislative history fail to define these
key terms.229 In the following year, the FY 2021 NDAA added a few
more reporting requirements to the quarterly cyber operations
briefings. With congressional frustration mounting about the DOD’s
failure to keep it apprised, SASC reiterated that the briefings
should include “all offensive and significant defensive military
operations” and reporting of operations “even short of effects.”230
The FY 2021 NDAA also updated the sensitive military cyber
operations notification statute, changing the definition of “sensitive
military cyber operations” from a focus on geographic location to the
identity of the targets.231 Rather than requiring notification of
operations outside an area of hostilities, the statute now defines
sensitive military cyber operations as those that are “intended to
achieve a cyber effect against a foreign terrorist organization or a
country, including its armed forces and the proxy forces of that
country located elsewhere” with which the United States is not
involved in hostilities or has not acknowledged being involved in
hostilities.232 Although it is not clear what specifically prompted the
227. FY 2020 NDAA, supra note 182, § 1632.
228. Robert Chesney, Military Cyber Operations: The New NDAA Tailors the 48-Hour
Notification Requirement, LAWFARE (Dec. 18, 2019, 9:22 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
military-cyber-operations-new-ndaa-tailors-48-hour-notification-requirement [https://perma.
cc/WN45-HVH8].
229. FY 2020 NDAA, supra note 182, § 1644(a). For the reporting requirements, see
Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173.
230. S. REP. NO. 116-236, at 337 (2020).
231. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 1702, 134 Stat. 3388, 4080-81 (2020) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 395) [hereinafter FY 2021 NDAA].
232. Id.
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modification,233 the revised provision means that the defense committees must now be notified when cyber operations target new
adversaries. For example, the defense committees would not be
notified of cyber operations against the Assad regime under the old
definition, since the United States is already engaged in hostilities
in Syria, even if not against the regime. However, the same operation would have to be reported under the new definition.
Finally, Congress directed the DOD to take additional steps to
define a framework for cyber operations, with the goal of ensuring
their effectiveness.234 Section 1720 of the FY 2021 NDAA required
the Secretary of Defense to develop a framework to enhance the
“consistency, execution, and effectiveness of cyber hunt forward
operations.”235 The framework includes many requirements, including identifying selection criteria for proposed operations and
metrics to evaluate their effectiveness, and mandating a briefing to
the defense committees by May 1, 2021.236 In its committee report,
SASC endorsed the DOD’s hunt forward operations and explained
that the framework would “institutionaliz[e] these missions within
the Department” and enable the “execution of more successful
missions at an increased operational tempo.”237

233. Robert Chesney’s take is that the provision:
remove[s] that geographic test altogether (thus moving away from an apparent
focus on flagging cases entailing risk of diplomatic repercussions), replacing it
with ... a test triggered only where the targeted adversary is “a foreign terrorist
organization or country” (including a govt’s proxies) “with which” American
forces “are not involved in hostilities” (reflecting concern w/mission
creep/expansion & escalation risk) ... In short: high-stakes military cyber ops
against FTOs and government-controlled entities would all be subject to
notification, wherever they play out, except when we are in hostilities with that
adversary already.
Bobby Chesney (@BobbyChesney), TWITTER (Dec. 3, 2020, 11:00 PM), https://twitter.com/
bobbychesney/status/1334709170239664130?s=11 [https://perma.cc/TJP4-NR96].
234. FY 2021 NDAA, supra note 231, § 1720.
235. Id. § 1720(a).
236. Id. § 1720(b)-(c).
237. S. REP. NO. 116-236, at 336 (2020).
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Table 2: Summary of Cyber Operations Oversight Provisions238
Cyber Operations Reporting & Notification Requirements
Provision
Various

10 U.S.C. § 484
(FY 2014 NDAA)

10 U.S.C. § 395
(FY 2018 NDAA)

Requirement
One-time reports on DOD’s cyber
warfare policy.
“[Q]uarterly briefings on all offensive
and significant defensive military
operations in cyberspace” during the
preceding quarter.
48-hour notification of “any sensitive
military cyber operation conducted
under this title.”

Recipient
HASC; SASC

HASC; SASC

HASC; SASC

10 U.S.C. § 396
(FY 2018 NDAA)

Quarterly reporting of cyber weapons
reviews; 48-hour notification of the use
of cyber weapons.

HASC; SASC

FY 2018 NDAA,
§ 1644, amended
by FY 2020
NDAA, § 1635

Quadrennial review of the “cyber
posture of the United States.”

HASC; SASC

FY 2019 NDAA,
§ 1642(a)

FY 2019 NDAA,
§ 1642(c)

Quarterly reporting of actions
undertaken by Cyber Command
pursuant to the authorization “to take
appropriate and proportional action in
foreign cyberspace” in response to an
“active, systematic, and ongoing
campaign of attacks” by Russia, China,
North Korea, or Iran.
Annual report on “the scope and
intensity” of information operations and
cyber attacks by Russia, China, North
Korea, and Iran against the United
States and “adjustments of the
Department of Defense in the response
directed or recommended by the
Secretary.”

HASC; SASC

HASC; SASC
HFAC; SFRC
HPSCI; SSCI

238. All provisions in Figure 2 also require reporting to the House and Senate
appropriations committees.

186

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

FY 2020 NDAA,
§ 1644

Annual report “summarizing all named
military cyberspace operations
conducted in the previous calendar
year.”
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HASC; SASC

In sum, in recent years, Congress has strongly supported and
encouraged more proactive use of cyber operations in countering
malicious actors. To fill oversight gaps over these new operations,
which fell at the intersection of military and intelligence operations, Congress created new oversight obligations. But in solving
one problem, it created another: the NDAA process led by the armed
services committees resulted in the consolidation of military cyber
oversight in the hands of only one subset of Congress—the armed
services committees. It left little to no role for the foreign relations
or intelligence committees, despite the fact that foreign relations
and intelligence concerns are very much present when Cyber Command undertakes computer network operations against a target
outside an ongoing warzone. The novel oversight and legal challenges presented by military cyber operations offered an opportunity for congressional committees to think holistically about
oversight, but instead, HASC and SASC built on and reinforced
existing committee silos.
III. THE PATHOLOGY OF MODERN WARFARE OVERSIGHT:
INFORMATION SILOING
The most significant and consequential challenge presented by
Congress’s efforts to respond to the challenges of modern warfare as
described in Part II is that it has entrenched a system in which
information and reporting is segmented between discrete congressional committees. The structural challenge impedes effective, cohesive oversight over modern warfare. Information known to members
of one committee may be relevant to the work of another but may
nonetheless not be shared with that committee’s members. Legislators are thus left to make decisions on crucial national security
matters without access to the full range of relevant information.
This disjointed system likewise harms the executive branch, which
could be subject to poorly informed and ill-advised oversight. As long
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as this problem remains unsolved, Congress will find itself increasingly incapable of effectively exercising its constitutional role in
overseeing the executive branch’s conduct of modern warfare.
A. Information Siloing: A Problem of Congress’s Own Making
As Part II described, nearly every year since 2013, Congress has
strengthened and clarified modern warfare oversight measures.239
Due to significant challenges with passing legislation,240 nearly all
of these requirements have been included in the “must pass” annual NDAA.241 Because the NDAA is “the only piece of legislation
getting through on an annual basis, it becomes a Christmas tree on
which everything else is hung,” a congressional staff member explained.242 The NDAA process is under the armed services committees’ jurisdiction, giving these committees authorizing power
over the bill.243
1. The Power of the “Must Pass” NDAA
The armed services committees have leveraged their privileged
position in the NDAA process to consolidate their jurisdiction over
239. See supra Part II.
240. The average number of laws passed each year has declined considerably over the past
decades. Three hundred forty-four laws were passed from January 2019 to January 2021,
compared to 736 laws passed from January 1979 to December 1980. Statistics and Historical
Comparison, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics [https://perma.cc/
35Y2-DU8X]; see also Vital Statistics on Congress, Chapter 6: Legislative Productivity in
Congress and Workload, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 8, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/multichapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress [https://perma.cc/56XV-2B6F]. For analysis on the
reasons for this productivity decline, see Derek Willis & Paul Kane, How Congress Stopped
Working, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 5, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/howcongress-stopped-working [https://perma.cc/DGN4-QJLZ]; Ella Nilsen, House Democrats Have
Passed Nearly 400 Bills. Trump and Republicans Are Ignoring Them, VOX (Nov. 29, 2019, 7:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/11/29/20977735/how-many-bills-passed-house-democratstrump [https://perma.cc/NU8Q-T4AS]; Jesse M. Crosson, Alexander C. Furnas, Timothy
Lapira & Casey Burgat, Partisan Competition and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Among
Congressional Offices, LEGIS. STUD. Q., July 2019, at 1.
241. See Amanda Chuzi, Can Congress’ “Most Successful Bill” Fix the Legislative Branch?,
WAR ON THE ROCKS (June 5, 2020), https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/can-congress-mostsuccessful-bill-fix-the-legislative-branch [https://perma.cc/5PXT-VEYM].
242. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #2, supra note 175.
243. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN & BRENDAN W. MCGARRY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10515,
DEFENSE PRIMER: THE NDAA PROCESS (2021).
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modern warfare operations—whether it is drones, special operations, security cooperation, or cyber.244 This reporting scheme tracks
the fact that the DOD implements most counterterrorism and cyber
operations, and the armed services committees have jurisdiction
over most DOD operations. But as discussed in Part II, the statutory
oversight framework has explicitly excluded other relevant committees from even being made aware of the reporting, despite those
committees’ clear equities in modern warfare operations.245 Likewise, the intelligence committees keep intelligence reporting extremely closely held, pointing to the highly classified nature of the
information to avoid informing other committees. Thus, each of the
three respective sets of committees—armed services, intelligence,
and foreign relations—have their own discrete reporting pipeline,
which has led to information silos and knowledge gaps that frustrate comprehensive oversight.246
2. Committee Membership Rules
Political party rules have further complicated this siloing problem by prohibiting joint membership between related committees.
For example, Republican senators are prohibited from serving on
both SASC and SFRC.247 There have been some attempts to
overcome the problem and facilitate information flow by requiring
that certain members serve on multiple related committees. In the
House of Representatives, for instance, at least one Democratic
244. For the full chart, see Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173; Oona A. Hathaway, Tobias Kuehne, Randi Michel & Nicole Ng, Appendix B: Special Operations, Drone
Strikes, and Targeted Killings (same URL) [hereinafter Appendix B: Special Operations,
Drone Strikes, and Targeted Killings]; Oona A. Hathaway, Tobias Kuehne, Randi Michel &
Nicole Ng, Appendix C: Security Cooperation (same URL) [hereinafter Appendix C: Security
Cooperation].
245. See supra Part II; see also Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173; Appendix
B: Special Operations, Drone Strikes, and Targeted Killings, supra note 244; Appendix C:
Security Cooperation; supra note 244.
246. In fact, cybersecurity oversight more generally is spread across multiple committees,
including armed services, intelligence, homeland security, and commerce, among others, but
information is not always shared between committees. As one committee staffer described,
“[e]very committee on the Hill has a piece of cyber,” resulting in a “very convoluted picture.”
Interview with Congressional Staff Member #3, supra note 19.
247. As well as judiciary and appropriations. JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 98-183,
SENATE COMMITTEES: CATEGORIES AND RULES FOR COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS 1 (2014).
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member must serve on both HFAC and HASC.248 Nevertheless, a
congressional staff member observed that only having one or two
joint members (all below the leadership level) has minimal impact
on cross-committee information sharing since the committee chairs
and ranking members remain uninformed and it is challenging for
one member to significantly steer the conversation.249
3. Classification Restrictions
Even when some members sit on multiple committees, they are
often restricted from sharing information due to classification
rules, even if directly relevant to matters before the committee.
Although members of Congress are entitled to access classified information by virtue of their offices, their staff are generally not.250
Members of Congress also are not automatically entitled to
“Sensitive Compartmented Information” (SCI) access.251 Some,
though not all, classified information is separated into “compartments.”252 These compartments are independent of the classification
level. There can be compartmented information at every level of
classification, and only those with access to the particular compartment can access the information, even if they otherwise have
248. Both Representatives Bill Keating and Chrissy Houlahan currently serve on the
House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. Committees and Caucuses, OFF. OF
CONGRESSMAN BILL KEATING, https://keating.house.gov/policy-work/committees-and-caucuses
[https://perma.cc/WQD9-MPYJ]; Committees and Caucuses, OFF. OF CONGRESSWOMAN
CHRISSY HOULAHAN, https://houlahan.house.gov/about/committees-and-caucuses.htm [https://
perma.cc/3S3D-VPMP]. Joaquin Castro serves on both Foreign Affairs and Intelligence, and
Jackie Speier serves on both Armed Services and Intelligence. Committees and Caucuses, OFF.
OF CONGRESSMAN JOAQUIN CASTRO, https://castro.house.gov/about/ committees-and-caucuses
[https://perma.cc/SE57-ZNET]; Committees, OFF. OF CONGRESSWOMAN JACKIE SPEIER, https://
speier.house.gov/committees [https://perma.cc/EVY9-8Q67].
249. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1 (Aug. 26, 2020).
250. See 50 U.S.C. § 3163 (exempting members of Congress, but not their staff, from
statutory provisions governing access to classified information); Mandy Smithberger & Daniel
Schuman, A Primer on Congressional Staff Clearances, POGO (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.
pogo.org/report/2020/02/a-primer-on-congressional-staff-clearances [https://perma.cc/M3MSRJ9U]; FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS20748, PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION BY CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 1, 3 (2011); MICHELLE D.
CHRISTENSEN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43216, SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS: ANSWERS TO
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 4, 5 (2016).
251. See Smithberger & Schuman, supra note 250.
252. See id.
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the appropriate level of security clearance (for example, Top Secret
(TS)). Who decides who has access to particular compartments?
Access is granted on a “need to know” basis.253 So who decides who
needs to know? Congress and the executive branch differ on that.
Congress maintains that it has the right to make the determination,
but the executive branch maintains that the decision “is made by
the agency where the information originated.”254
In the face of this standoff, the executive branch, which controls
access to the information, wins. A former senior congressional
staffer expressed that if Congress were to assert its authority to
make rules about access to classified information, the executive
branch might be more willing to work with Congress.255
In any case, the consequences of members’ inability to share information across committees can be serious. For instance, on
January 2, 2020, a U.S. drone strike killed Major General Qassim
Soleimani, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps Quds Force, without consultation or approval from Congress.256 The strike capped off over a year of escalation between the
United States and Iran that brought both countries to the brink of
war.257 Following the Soleimani strike, SASC and SFRC debated
possible strategic responses but lacked crucial information about

253. For more on the “need to know” and other requirements for Special Compartmented
Information (SCI) access, see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MANUAL NO.
5105.21-V3, SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY
MANUAL 11-14 (2020), https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodm/510
521m_vol3.pdf?ver=2020-09-15-132603-533 [https://perma.cc/2H6Z-KFD3].
254. Smithberger & Schuman, supra note 250.
255. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
256. Mustafa Salim, Missy Ryan, Liz Sly & John Hudson, In Major Escalation, American
Strike Kills Top Iranian Commander in Baghdad, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2020, 3:02 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/defense-secretary-says-iran-and-its-proxiesmay-be-planning-fresh-attacks-on-us-personnel-in-iraq/2020/01/02/53b63f00-2d89-11ea-bcb3ac6482c4a92f_story.html [https://perma.cc/8AHT-H6SM]; Manu Raju & Ted Barrett, Top
Democratic Leaders Kept in Dark About Soleimani Attack, CNN (Jan. 3, 2020, 2:46 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/03/politics/congress-soleimani-attack/index.html [https://perma.
cc/9EW2-J3X8].
257. See Salim et al., supra note 256; Karoun Demirjian, Senate Passes Resolution to Limit
Trump’s Power to Order Military Action Against Iran, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2020, 6:01 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/senate-passes-resolution-limiting-trumpagainst-iran-in-bipartisan-vote/2020/02/13/d2f7429c-4e8f-11ea-bf44-f5043eb3918a_story.html
[https://perma.cc/D92M-2D9Z].
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U.S. cyber operations against Iran.258 Indeed, Senator Tim Kaine, a
member of both SASC and SFRC, expressed frustration that he
could not disclose information that was critical to SFRC’s discussion
of the Soleimani strike, but had been communicated to him in
classified SASC briefings.259 Most likely, this information was
compartmented, and the relevant agency had determined that it
was relevant to one committee (due to reporting requirements) but
not the other. Senator Kaine also likely signed a nondisclosure
agreement when he gained access to the compartmented information that prohibited him from disclosing anything he learned by
virtue of that access.260
One committee staff member explained that the narrow compartmentalization of classified information has led to “frustrations
even within the context of our committee,” as information is limited
to only certain members and staffers.261 It can even create divisions
between members and their staff. One staffer we spoke with recalled that he had relevant information from a previous committee
assignment that he could not share with his boss, a member of
Congress, because that member was not cleared into the relevant
program. He could not even explain that there was information that
the member needed to know without violating his nondisclosure
obligations.262
Some observers argue that limiting information sharing is necessary to minimize the risk of unauthorized disclosures and that
even the perception of potential leaks resulting from extensive
disclosure may dissuade an agency from sharing operational details
or from briefing Congress at all.263 As one former congressional staff
member explained, “Congress always gets tarnished with its reputation as being leakers.”264 However, the interviewee argued, this
concern is vastly overblown, as the few members of Congress known

258. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1, supra note 249.
259. Id.
260. It is possible that he considered himself bound by the “secrecy oath” that some
members and staff are required by Senate rules to take. See KAISER, supra note 84, at 4.
261. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #3, supra note 19.
262. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
263. Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving
Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1071 (2008).
264. Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
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for leaking are not typically on committees with jurisdiction over
national security matters.265 Of course, observers disagree as to the
magnitude of the leakage problem and whether the executive
branch over-classifies information, creating more problems than it
solves.266 In addition, the executive branch at times simply fails to
specify exactly what information is classified. One congressional
staffer observed, “Generally members walk out of intelligence
briefings and they don’t know what is and isn’t classified. Because
the DNI uttered the words they feel like they can’t say anything,
even though details were reported by the New York Times.”267
Classification also restricts the potential for informal relationship-based information sharing. The siloing of reporting streams
would be significantly less consequential if committees had a formal
or even informal mechanism to exchange information. Classification
restrictions, however, inhibit committee members and staffers from
ensuring their colleagues with equities in the matter are informed.
4. Inter-Committee Turf Wars
This siloing dynamic reflects and is exacerbated by a more fundamental challenge within Congress: enduring turf wars between
committees.268 In a world where “information is power,” congressional committees have incentives to keep information closely held.269
Former Director for Counterterrorism at the National Security
Council (NSC) Daniel Rosenthal explains that “the oversight committees often compete with one another for access to information
265. Id.
266. For more information on over-classification by the executive branch, see April Doss,
The White House Abused the Classification System, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.the
atlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/uses-and-abuses-information-classification/599533
[https://perma.cc/MB93-ZR6G]; Examining the Costs of Overclassification on Transparency
and Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 2
(2016) (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t
Reform) (“Estimates range from 50 to 90 percent of classified material is not properly
labeled.”); Ann Koppuzha, Secrets and Security: Overclassification and Civil Liberty in
Administrative National Security Decisions, 80 ALB. L. REV. 501, 507-09 (2016); Oona A.
Hathaway, Secrecy’s End, 107 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
267. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
268. See generally DAVID C. KING, TURF WARS: HOW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES CLAIM
JURISDICTION 11-12 (1997).
269. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #3, supra note 19.
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and actively lobby the executive branch to deny the other oversight
committees access to information that they deem within their sole
jurisdiction.”270 Without a forcing mechanism like the executive
branch’s NSC-led interagency policy process, committees “jealously
guard their territories.”271 A congressional staffer observed that “the
deployment of cyber tools is one of the most closely guarded secrets.”272 Turf wars are also reinforced by a committee’s sense of its
own culture and traditions. Despite the foreign relations committees’ jurisdiction over war powers, the sense of the armed services
committees is that they are the committees that really “do war.” 273
Committees lack the incentives to share information, and leadership and personalities can entrench the turf war mindset. One
congressional staffer remarked that the absence of information
access creates more curiosity than is warranted.274 Yet, when a committee does let down its guard and allows outside members to gain
access to its information, there is always a “risk that insight turns
into oversight.”275 According to interviews with congressional staff
members, a committee’s ability to assert its jurisdiction and guard
information also depends on the personalities of committee and
congressional leadership. For example, Speaker of the House Nancy
Pelosi, as a former HPSCI member, has, according to one interviewee, supported the intelligence committees’ efforts to withhold
information from other committees. Likewise, committee leaders’
specific personalities, stature, and assertiveness can significantly
influence the committee’s success in jurisdictional turf battles.276
This Section has examined how Congress itself has contributed
to information siloing among committees operating in the national
security context. The next Section shows how this development has
undermined Congress’s capacity to effectively oversee the work of
the executive branch in the national security arena.
270. Daniel Rosenthal, “Congress Perhaps?” Congressional Oversight and the U.S. Drone
Program, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SEC. (July 31, 2018), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/
congress-perhaps-congressional-oversight-and-the-u-s-drone-program [https://perma.cc/B2K2HP43].
271. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1, supra note 249.
272. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
273. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
274. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
275. Id.
276. See Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
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B. Siloing and Its Implications for Oversight and National
Security
While committees may gain political benefits from guarding
their turfs, information siloing frustrates Congress’s ability to carry out effective oversight of the executive branch. The information
gaps resulting from siloing of reporting and notification may lead to
poorly informed and under-vetted congressional decision-making.
Ultimately, information siloing of modern military operations can
harm national security and foreign relations.
1. Siloing Obstructs Deliberation and Informed Legislating
Information siloing can obstruct deliberation and thus block informed legislating. If an operation is briefed to only one committee,
members who are informed may lack the ability to engage in
meaningful deliberation with other members, thereby impeding a
proper response.277 A former SFRC staffer expressed the difficulty
of conducting effective oversight when the committee is left in the
dark on related operations: “[H]ow can you make foreign relations
policy without having access to one of the most potentially influential capabilities to influence foreign relations?”278 Another staffer
illustrated the dilemma with a hypothetical: imagine there is a critical intelligence program that involves close cooperation with the
military of a partner country.279 The foreign relations committees
have not been briefed on, and are not aware of, the program. As a
result, they may not understand why the administration refuses to
press that country on its human rights record—a record that “we
would never let go generally.”280 If the foreign relations committees
do not know about the intelligence program, they would be unable
to understand why U.S. foreign policy toward that country contradicts our values. And they would not be in a position to discuss the
appropriateness of this foreign policy trade-off.281 When issues are

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See KAISER, supra note 84, at 5-6.
Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
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briefed just to the Gang of Eight, the problems of impeded information sharing become particularly acute. As a former staffer explained, “Then it’s just a small group of members. It causes all kinds
of spillover effects.”282 For instance, when Congress was asked to
reauthorize the § 215 collection program in 2011, most members
were unaware of existing bulk collection programs carried out under
intelligence authorities.283 Committee members had to fight to get
a document describing these activities opened up to members, and
then only in a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
(SCIF) at the TS/SCI level.284 If that had not been done, members
voting on the reauthorization would have been entirely unaware of
how it interacted with existing collection programs.285
Indeed, to exercise their authorities over the process of commencing war via authorizations for the use of force or restricting uses of
force through the WPR, the foreign relations committees must be
fully informed of uses of U.S. military power. After the Soleimani
strike, for example, the foreign relations committees weighed what
might be an appropriate response to Iranian retaliation, while being
left in the dark about the ongoing or potential cyber, intelligence,
and other operations between the United States and Iran.286 While
the Senate and House ultimately voted to restrain the President
from using force, better information sharing would have allowed the
senators to make a more informed decision.287
Information siloing poses a particularly acute challenge to
deliberation and informed legislating on cross-jurisdictional issues
like cyber operations. As a DOD lawyer observed, congressional
committees “are not structured to take a holistic approach to the
problem of cyberspace,” which challenges traditional paradigms of
jurisdiction that are focused on physical spaces (for example,
commercial, domestic, and overseas) and actors (for example, government agencies, departments, and private sector).288 Cyber operations and cybersecurity transcend these distinctions and cut
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
Demirjian, supra note 257; Wise, supra note 70.
Interview with U.S. Department of Defense Lawyer, supra note 196.
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across issues of foreign affairs, intelligence, and defense, but
congressional committees remain confined by these parameters. The
Cyberspace Solarium Commission observed that the dispersal of
oversight responsibilities across numerous committees and subcommittees “prevents Congress from effectively providing strategic
oversight of the executive branch’s cybersecurity efforts or exerting
its traditional oversight authority for executive action and policy in
cyberspace.”289 Information siloing also complicates oversight over
military cyber operations, which blur the jurisdictional lines
between Title 10 and Title 50 that traditionally divided military and
intelligence oversight within Congress.290 As Tressa Guenov and
Tommy Ross have observed, “It is nearly impossible to consider
cyber deterrence and the role of offensive cyber attacks in military
operations without encroaching on business, homeland security,
foreign policy, and criminal justice issues.”291
Information siloing also limits the ability of committees to
consider how various legislative actions might affect and be affected
by other programs already in place. Consider a hypothetical example involving Russia. In weighing whether and how to craft
sanctions legislation against Russia for election interference, the
foreign relations committees should have an understanding of all
the tools brought to bear against Russia to counter or deter meddling—including cyber operations, such as those carried out by
Cyber Command during the 2018 midterm elections.292 More generally, as relations with Russia remain tense, since the foreign
relations committees are charged with overseeing the executive’s
conduct of foreign relations with Russia,293 it is critical that they
understand the full nature of the bilateral relationship, including
hostile and potentially escalatory activities like military cyber
operations. However, although there may be informal exchanges of
289. U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N, supra note 20, at 35.
290. See supra Part II.A.
291. Tressa Guenov & Tommy Ross, At A Crossroads, Part I: How Congress Can Find Its
Way Back to Effective Defense Oversight, WAR ON THE ROCKS (Mar. 9, 2018), https://waronthe
rocks.com/2018/03/at-a-crossroads-part-i-how-congress-can-find-its-way-back-to-effectivedefense-oversight [https://perma.cc/5XW8-QCP7].
292. See Pomerleau, supra note 223. We are not aware of whether this operation was
reported to the armed services committees as a sensitive military cyber operation, nor do we
know whether the foreign relations committees were informed of the operation.
293. See SFRC BACKGROUND, supra note 34, at 4.
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information, the DOD is under no statutory obligation to report
cyber operations against Russia to the foreign relations committees.294
The foreign relations committees are particularly affected by
their lack of access to information about other programs and operations. While successive iterations of the NDAA have established
new reporting and notification requirements for modern military
operations, the reports almost all go to the armed services committees. The foreign relations committees receive virtually none of that
information. This is even the case for operations with implications
falling squarely within the foreign relations committees’ jurisdiction. One telling example is the aforementioned FY 2019 NDAA,
which functions as a quasi-AUMF for cyber operations against
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran.295 The consequences extend
beyond the committees’ role in use of force authorizations, as well.
For example, as described earlier, when HFAC was considering a
“massive Pakistan aid package,” the CIA failed to inform the committee of the drone program in that country, even though it had obvious implications for U.S.-Pakistan relations.296 HFAC chairman
Howard Berman was ultimately informed about the drone program,
but he could not share the information with the rest of the committee because he was the only member read into the highly classified
program.297 And in 2014, the SFRC considered and supported legislation to train and equip Syrian rebels, even though the chair and
ranking member did not know any details of what media later reported to be the CIA’s parallel covert program,298 which had been
initiated the year before.299

294. See Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173.
295. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
296. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
297. Id.
298. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
299. See Tom Bowman & Alice Fordham, CIA Is Quietly Ramping up Aid to Syrian Rebels,
Sources Say, NPR (Apr. 23, 2014, 5:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2014/04/23/
306233248/cia-is-quietly-ramping-up-aid-to-syrian-rebels-sources-say [https://perma.cc/HX2VU8LG]; Mazzetti et al., supra note 131.
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2. Siloing Means No Committee Has the Complete Picture
Information siloing means that no committee—and no member—
has the complete picture of modern warfare operations. As a result,
members are often called on to make crucial decisions without the
full range of relevant information in hand. Based on our interviews,
information siloing appears to be a particularly significant problem
in the counterterrorism context, including special forces operations
and drone strikes.300 As former National Security Council Director
for Counterterrorism Daniel Rosenthal explained:
[N]umerous members of Congress, countless congressional
staffers, and multiple committees all have access to some
information about the drone program.... [N]o single member of
Congress, congressional staffer, or oversight committee has
visibility over all drone platforms, all strikes, taken in all
theaters both within and outside of areas of active hostilities.301

The tragic events in Niger that led to the deaths of American
special forces, recounted at the outset of this Article, illustrate
some of the dangers that can result from this lack of visibility.
Those deaths might have been avoided if not for the siloed oversight
over those operations, which meant that no one in Congress was
aware of the full extent of U.S. involvement in the country. Even
when there is the rare collaboration between committees, the
foreign relations committees are often the odd man out. This is true
even though counterterrorism operations generally require the
approval of the U.S. embassy for the country where the operation
will take place.302 U.S. embassies and consulates are part of the
State Department (organized under the Bureau of Consular Affairs)303 and thus under the oversight jurisdiction of the foreign

300. A congressional staff member highlighted that the siloing problem affects both
counterterrorism and cyber operations, but is more acute in the counterterrorism context.
Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
301. Rosenthal, supra note 270.
302. Though their approval is necessary, ambassadors can be overridden. See SERAFINO,
supra note 113, at 9.
303. See About Us—Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://www.state.
gov/about-us-bureau-of-consular-affairs/ [https://perma.cc/PS7G-DDDG].
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relations committees.304 These committees are rarely notified of
counterterrorism operations, despite the fact that they oversee
embassies and diplomatic relations.305 This information gap thus
inhibits the committees’ capacity to effectively oversee the agency
for which they are responsible.
Information sharing restrictions and narrow notification and
reporting obligations allow the executive branch to control committees’ access to information. Like the foreign relations committees,
the intelligence committees generally do not receive reporting or
notification on military cyber operations. As one congressional staffer observed, “When it comes to DOD activities, HPSCI feels itself
pretty frozen out.”306 The intelligence committees are only briefed on
operations conducted under intelligence authorities. If Cyber Command and the CIA conduct coordinated or supported cyberattacks,
each agency will brief its respective oversight committee on its own
activities, and neither committee will have the full picture.307
Moreover, it is often up to the executive to determine how much of
a joint operation to disclose.308
Indeed, agencies sometimes exploit congressional committee
jurisdictional divisions and turf wars to avoid onerous oversight. In
the case of cyber operations, the armed services committees are
perceived by some observers as friendlier to the military and less
willing to engage in rigorous oversight.309 The executive branch “will
hand-feed the congressional committees that they care about, but
they will do anything in their power to avoid cooperating with the
‘other’ committees.”310 As a former Cyber Command lawyer put it,
“If you’re the CIA you may say you aren’t talking to the armed service committees, they do not have my interests at heart, and vice
versa.”311 Information silos can thus privilege the executive branch
at Congress’s expense.

304. See supra Part I.A.
305. Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
306. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
307. See Rosenthal, supra note 270; Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra
note 22.
308. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
309. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1, supra note 249.
310. Rosenthal, supra note 270.
311. Interview with former Cyber Command Lawyer (Oct. 6, 2020).
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3. Information Siloing Exacerbates Institutional Jealousies and
Impedes Agency Coordination
Information siloing may reinforce interagency competition within the executive branch, which may inhibit the government’s
broader capacity to effectively address security threats. Andru Wall
explains that siloing is both “legally incongruous and operationally
dangerous because it suggests statutory authorities are mutually
exclusive and it creates concerns about interagency cooperation at
exactly the time in history when our policy and legal structures
should be encouraging increased interagency coordination and
cooperation against interconnected national security threats.”312 In
fact, when agencies compete with one another, they can leverage
information silos to advance their own equities with their congressional patrons.
A former congressional staff member recalled an incident in
which the CIA and the DOD sought to displace each other from
parallel operations in the same country, which included efforts to
elevate concerns up to the host country’s head of state. “The
oversight seams made this challenging,” the staff member recalled,
“on these committees, the agencies played members off each other,
getting members to be advocates for them rather than overseers.”313
Members of Congress made calls to the White House on behalf of
their agencies, asking why the other agency was involved. “This was
embarrassing from an oversight standpoint, but also potentially
damaging from a national security standpoint,” the staffer added.314
***
This Part has examined the ways in which information siloing
impedes Congress’s ability to provide effective oversight of modern
warfare and thus harms national security. Ironically, while Congress publicly recognizes the challenges facing executive branch
coordination and has urged stronger coordination,315 it has not
312.
313.
314.
315.

Wall, supra note 11, at 92.
Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
Id.
For example, in Avril Haines’s January 19, 2021, confirmation hearing for her
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applied the same logic or solutions to its own institutional structure. Siloing, therefore, does not merely cut out certain committees,
but it also hinders Congress’s ability to effectively carry out its legislating, war making, and oversight roles. The next Part considers
possible reforms to address this problem.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
When properly and effectively exercised, congressional oversight
ensures that lawmakers have all the information they need to carry
out their constitutional duties to monitor the activities of the
executive branch and make appropriate legislative decisions. But
the current regime falls short. As Part III demonstrated, Congress’s
approach to modern warfare oversight has entrenched information
siloing, stymying Congress’s ability to exercise rigorous and strategic oversight and leading to poorly informed and under-vetted
congressional decision-making.316 This Part first considers an ambitious structural reform to committee jurisdictions: the creation of
a super committee to oversee all modern warfare operations. If the
problem is that no committee has a complete view of the problem,
the obvious solution is to join the committees together. But after
considering how this might work, we conclude that the very same
dynamics that have led to and entrenched information siloing would
make such a solution impossible to implement and might even
create other oversight problems. We then advance four alternative
ambitious, but feasible, proposals to address information siloing.
The most significant of these is the creation of a Congressional
National Security Council to mirror the executive branch’s National
Security Council (NSC)—an institution created after World War II

nomination as Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Senator King asked Haines how she
would “overcome ... the parochialism of the 11 agencies which you are called upon to lead?”
He emphasized, “[D]on’t forget the basic purpose [of the DNI position] was that we realized
we had really good stovepipes, but they were still stovepipes. So, that’s your mission.” On the
Nomination of Avril D. Haines to be Director of National Intelligence: Hearing Before the S.
Select Comm. on Intel., 117th Cong. 73-75 (2021) (statement of Sen. Angus King, Member, S.
Select Comm. on Intel.), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/tahaines-011921.pdf [perma.cc/E9DV-DJKQ].
316. See supra Part III.A.
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to address precisely the same problems on the executive branch
side that Congress now faces.
A. Why Not Create a Super Committee?
The problems documented in this Article offer a strong argument
in favor of significant structural reforms that would modify
committee jurisdictions. If the problem is separate silos, after all,
why not simply merge the silos into one? Perhaps the committees
with equities in overseeing modern warfare—armed services,
intelligence, and foreign relations—should be merged into a single
committee, or at the very least they should receive the same reporting on cross-jurisdictional issues like counterterrorism and
cyber operations.
This type of proposal is not new. The 9/11 Commission noted
that there were seventeen congressional committees with some
intelligence oversight duties and recommended better unifying
congressional oversight to improve Congress’s capacity to properly
oversee intelligence activities.317 Although the 9/11 Commission
focused on a different problem, the challenges we document are
similar: too many committees with responsibility for parts of the
same problems and no committee with full insight into how these
problems interrelate.
To be sure, creating a consolidated national security committee
has advantages. First, there would be no more confusion between
Title 10 and Title 50 reporting, no more information siloing or turf
wars between these committees, and no duplicative briefings and
multiplicitous reporting chains for the executive branch. Second,
combining the committees would acknowledge the reality that
separating Title 10 and Title 50 operations has become increasingly
untenable in the post-9/11 world.318 Third, having all the relevant
reporting go to a single committee would reduce the potential for
information gaps among lawmakers, allowing Congress to legislate
more effectively.
Despite these potential advantages, the realities of Congress
make merging committees difficult, if not outright impossible. Deep
317. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 108, at 103-07, 419.
318. See supra Part II.
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structural change is hardly feasible unless there is extraordinary
political will. Redrawing or eliminating committee jurisdictions will
be met with intense opposition. As the 9/11 Commission put it, “Few
things are more difficult to change in Washington than congressional committee jurisdiction and prerogatives.”319 Siloing, after all,
arises out of turf battles in which committees jealously guard their
access to information. If a committee’s independence and separate
existence are at stake, these turf battles will hardly give way.
Replacing the armed services, foreign relations, and intelligence
committees with a single national security committee is almost
certainly impossible. More than one-quarter of the entire Senate is
on SASC.320 If the three committees were merged, the size of the
merged committee would have to be smaller than the current size
of the three combined, or it would be so large as to be incapable of
functioning. But cutting members from these committees, each of
which is considered a plum committee assignment, is politically
fraught.
The alternative—creating a new “super committee” that would sit
above the existing committees and address cross-jurisdictional issues—also faces functional and political challenges. If this new
super committee gains jurisdiction, another committee will necessarily lose it. As one staff member put it, are the “members of armed
services [going to] watch this super committee create really important legislation that’s partly in their jurisdiction and just let that
go and not scream about it?”321 In an environment where losing
committee jurisdiction means losing the capacity to change key legislation, the answer is certainly no. The staff member added:
319. 9/11 COMMISSION, supra note 108, at 419. In fact, despite the 9/11 Commission’s
emphatic call for structural reform, its recommendations were never implemented. See
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., TENTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT CARD: THE STATUS OF THE 9/11
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 16 (2011), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/
2019/03/CommissionRecommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Y6M-HCBZ]. Seven years later,
the Bipartisan Policy Center reflected that committee jurisdiction continued to be carved up
to “accommodate antiquated committee structures,” as “[t]he rules governing congressional
organization reflect the needs and economy of the 19th century, not the challenges of the 21st
century.” Id.
320. Committee Membership List: Committee on Armed Services, U.S.SENATE, https://www.
senate.gov/general/committee_membership/committee_memberships_SSAS.htm [https://
perma.cc/7E9G-XSUP] (listing twenty-six members).
321. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.

204

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:137

Nowadays we don’t vote on amendments on the floor to influence
a piece of legislation. That makes this [new super committee]
structure harder. You vote for cloture or don’t. You vote for the
manager’s packet of amendments or not. That’s kind of how it
works. If you aren’t on the committee that produces the legislation, you don’t get to play. The dysfunction that has settled in
makes [a supercommittee] less realistic.322

Moreover, the expertise required for intelligence, military, and
foreign affairs oversight differs considerably. Indeed, the intelligence committees were created as separate entities in the 1970s in
part because it was understood that their members needed to
specialize in the subject matter.323 The merger would also raise
challenges for agency oversight, as the committee would now be responsible for overseeing all the activities of the DOD and the CIA.
Merging the committees would put seventeen intelligence agencies
under the jurisdiction of the armed services and foreign relations/
affairs committees, which would threaten to overburden committee
members and staff and could result in less efficient, effective, and
robust oversight overall.
A related structural fix—and one that might be more feasible—
would be not to merge the committees themselves, but to merge the
committees into a single committee only for cross-jurisdictional purposes, such as cyber-related reporting. Specifically, Congress could
require that the armed services, intelligence, and foreign relations
committees all receive the same reporting and notifications for cyber
operations—such as forty-eight-hour notification of sensitive cyber
military operations, quarterly briefings, and annual reports.324 If
every committee were to receive the same information, the argument goes, the siloing problem would significantly decrease, at least
for the matters that are briefed.
Unfortunately, this proposal also runs into practical challenges.
If each committee were to receive the same information, could any
of them still be said to have jurisdiction over the issue? In Congress,
jurisdiction is key. And with six committees receiving comprehensive reporting from the DOD, for example, all six might try to assert
322. Id.
323. See Johnson, supra note 200, at 199-201.
324. See Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173.
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(sometimes conflicting) influence over the DOD. The armed services
committees would almost certainly refuse to give up exclusive jurisdiction over certain military operations. Moreover, the DOD would
likely vehemently resist this requirement, arguing that such a broad
reporting regime would be too time-consuming and vulnerable to
leaking. Instead, the DOD would likely listen to the committees that
control its funding and appropriations: the defense committees.
A narrower version of this proposal would involve expanding the
statutory recipients for only some of the reporting requirements to
balance information sharing with jurisdictional concerns. In the
context of cyber operations, reporting could be expanded for the
quarterly cyber briefings, the annual report on named cyber operations, and the quadrennial cyber posture review.325 However, the
armed services committees may still resist losing their exclusive
jurisdiction.326 Proposals to expand reporting on cyber operations to
the intelligence and foreign relations committees are also likely to
run into the “slippery slope” problem, with critics arguing that other
committees with some jurisdiction over cyber affairs, such as homeland security, commerce, and judiciary, will seek to be included as
well.327
Notably, the widely celebrated Solarium Commission Report
proposes a variation on the committee reorganization theme: it
recommends that the House and Senate each create a select committee on cybersecurity to consolidate budgetary and legislative
jurisdiction over cybersecurity issues.328 The proposal, in addition to
likely running into some of the practical impediments that any
proposal to reorganize committee structures will meet, has the
added downside of further cleaving off cyber oversight from other
oversight activities. If the central concern motivating reform is to
consolidate oversight of cyber activities, then this approach makes
sense. But what it fails to recognize is that cyber is intertwined with
so much else that Congress must oversee. In short, while the Solarium Commission’s proposal integrates the information silos for
cyber, it does not solve the more fundamental problem these silos
325.
326.
327.
328.

See Appendix A: Cyber Operations, supra note 173.
See id.
Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
See U.S. CYBERSPACE SOLARIUM COMM’N, supra note 20, at 35-36.
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create—uninformed legislating for everything else. In fact, it
threatens to exacerbate these challenges by creating a new information silo that is even further dissociated from the lawmaking work
of the relevant committees.
In short, any effort to take lawmaking authority over crossjurisdictional matters away from existing committees would meet
vigorous opposition.329 Indeed, similar efforts over the last decade to
create select committees on cybersecurity, such as by Senator John
McCain in 2011, were unsuccessful;330 almost every committee leader refused to give up jurisdiction to a select committee.331 The next
Section therefore considers four alternative reforms.
B. Four Proposals for Reform
While a new super committee is not feasible, and perhaps not
even desirable, our interviews confirmed that there is increasing
awareness among members of Congress and their staff that crosscutting issues such as drones, special operations, security cooperation, and cyber operations require more inter-committee
coordination. In this Section, we propose four reforms that would
improve information sharing in Congress. The most significant of
these—the creation of a Congressional National Security Council
(C-NSC)—would draw on lessons learned from coordinating national security policy within the executive branch.
In proposing reforms, we recognize that any effort at oversight
reform will face significant political and administrative hurdles. We
acknowledge as well that even if these recommendations were
adopted, other oversight challenges would remain. For instance,
some critics of congressional oversight over modern warfare activities have pointed out that members of Congress do not have
sufficient technical expertise to serve as an effective check on the
executive.332 Underfunded and overstretched staff may lack the
329. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
330. See Ben Pershing, On Cybersecurity, Congress Can’t Agree on Turf, WASH. POST (July
18, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-cybersecurity-congress-cant-agree-onturf/2011/07/18/gIQACGCWMI_story.html [https://perma.cc/NR2U-5VVP].
331. Interview with Jamil N. Jaffer, supra note 27.
332. Molly E. Reynolds, Improving Congressional Capacity to Address Problems and
Oversee the Executive Branch, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/
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bandwidth to engage in rigorous oversight.333 Prioritizing oversight may be particularly challenging given the lack of political
incentives for members of Congress to engage in technical and
nuanced national security issues that are not at the forefront of
their constituents’ concerns. Decreased member interest in intraparty oversight can further limit Congress’s efficacy.334 On the flip
side, the executive branch may provide insufficient information to
Congress under reporting and notification requirements or may
sometimes even refuse to comply with reporting requirements altogether.335 As an SFRC staffer observed, “You’re really at the mercy
of the executive branch on what they’re willing to share.”336 And yet
while these proposed reforms will not solve all the problems that
plague congressional oversight of modern warfare, taking steps to
address information siloing will tackle an important set of weaknesses in the oversight system. No reform will address all of the
policy2020/bigideas/improving-congressional-capacity-to-address-problems-and-oversee-theexecutive-branch [https://perma.cc/A9GR-CDDN] (“Most individual member offices do not
have large enough budgets to consider paying staff members at the maximum level, but the
salary cap does affect the ability of committees, especially those with demands for sophisticated expertise, to attract and retain talent.”).
333. The challenges posed by the widely acknowledged under-resourcing of congressional
staff extend beyond just the national security realm. See, e.g., Alexander C. Furnas & Timothy
M. LaPira, Congressional Brain Drain: Legislative Capacity in the 21st Century, NEW AMERICA
44 (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.newamerica.org/political-reform/reports/congressional-braindrain/ [https://perma.cc/LQ7W-EKZQ] (“The cost of living adjusted wages for entry- and midlevel congressional staff who work 50 hours per week or more is paltry for supposedly the
most professional legislature in the world.”); Kathy Goldschmidt, State of the Congress: Staff
Perspectives on Institutional Capacity in the House and Senate, CONG. MGMT. FOUND. 9, 17
(2017), http://www.congressfoundation.org/storage/documents/CMF_Pubs/cmf-state-of-thecongress.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LHL-ZUPE] (noting that “House committees have 50% fewer
employees than they did in 1985 and Senate committees have 20% fewer”; only 6 percent of
congressional staffers were “very satisfied” with the amount of time and resources allocated
to “understand, consider and deliberate policy and legislation”).
334. Douglas Kriner, Can Enhanced Oversight Repair “the Broken Branch”?, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 765, 783 (2009) (“All too often, partisan incentives to support a President of the same
party trump institutional incentives to defend Congress’s institutional prerogatives by vigorously overseeing the actions of the executive branch.”).
335. See TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45653, CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS:
ENFORCING EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMPLIANCE 1-4 (2019). The trend of executive noncompliance
increased significantly during the Trump administration. See Fred Kaplan, Trump’s Contempt
for Democracy Has Reached New Depths, SLATE (Jan. 9, 2020, 5:20 PM), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2020/01/trump-congress-war-powers-iran.html [https://perma.cc/6CH8-ST
BQ].
336. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1, supra note 249.
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challenges at once, but that is no reason not to aim to make progress
where possible. As we stressed at the outset of this Article, information siloing is largely a problem of Congress’s own making and thus
can be fixed by Congress.337 That problems may remain in the oversight system is not a justification for failing to take the important
steps that are within Congress’s power.
1. Expand Cross-Committee Membership
Congress should expand cross-committee membership. Currently, SSCI includes two members each (one from each party) from
SASC, SFRC, judiciary, and appropriations.338 The armed services,
foreign affairs, and intelligence committees should follow the same
model, each requiring at least two members (one from each party)
from the other two respective committees. For example, SFRC
should include at least two members of SASC and two members of
SSCI. Similarly, HFAC should include at least two members from
HASC and two members from HPSCI. To implement this proposal,
Republicans should eliminate their internal rule that senators
cannot serve on both SASC and SFRC.339
Even more important, the chairs and ranking members of the
armed services, foreign relations, and intelligence committees
should each serve as ex-officio, nonvoting members on the other two
respective committees. As one committee staffer explained in an
interview, simply having crossover members is insufficient, since
one member cannot significantly steer the conversation involving
several members who are not read-in to the other committee’s
affairs.340 Therefore, committee leadership must also be included.
For example, SFRC leadership could serve as ex-officio, nonvoting
members on both SASC and SSCI. Current rules already allow the
chair and ranking member of the SASC to serve as ex-officio, nonvoting members on SSCI, so this system simply expands that
337. See supra Part III.A.
338. About the Committee, S. SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., https://www.intelligence.senate.
gov/about# [https://perma.cc/UK4U-7B5E].
339. This proposal focuses on the armed services, intelligence, and foreign relations
committees, because, as discussed supra notes 33 and 105, they share the vast majority of
oversight equities over modern warfare operations.
340. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1, supra note 249.
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existing structure.341 Several congressional staffers interviewed also
stressed the need to allow committee staff directors in the room,
either in addition to or instead of the members themselves.342 This
recommendation is likely more feasible than large-scale reform,
provided that the ex-officio members do not attempt to co-opt
oversight.
Moreover, the chair and ranking member of the foreign relations
committees should formally be conferees in the NDAA conference
process. There is precedent for this practice: two House Democrats
from HFAC served on the FY 2020 NDAA conference committee.343
On the Senate side, however, only members of SASC served on the
conference committee.344 Because nearly all modern warfare regulations today are passed through the NDAA, involvement in the
conference process is necessary to shape the oversight regime.345
2. Require Joint Briefings
Although expanding cross-committee membership can facilitate
information exchanges, there are times when the full committees
should be involved in, or have awareness of, a matter. To this end,
Congress should expand and formalize the use of joint briefings and
hearings, particularly for cross-cutting, high-stakes issues that
implicate the equities of multiple committees.
Joint briefings on overlapping issues can promote holistic and
collaborative oversight. A former congressional staff member recalled the benefits of conducting joint briefings following the raid
against Osama bin Laden, as members of Congress gained a fuller
341. SENATE RULES, supra note 35, R. XXV(4)(b)(3) at 29.
342. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #4, supra note 59.
343. Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives, Pelosi Names
Conferees to National Defense Authorization Act Conference (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.
speaker.gov/newsroom/91719-1 [https://perma.cc/6FHS-Y6L7].
344. S.1790: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1790/all-actions [https://perma.cc/V9
WY-Q9GM] (listing “Senate appointed conferees [on Sept. 18, 2019]: Inhofe; Wicker; Fischer;
Cotton; Rounds; Ernst; Tillis; Sullivan; Perdue; Cramer; McSally; Scott FL; Blackburn;
Hawley; Reed; Shaheen; Gillibrand; Blumenthal; Hirono; Kaine; King; Heinrich; Warren;
Peters; Manchin; Duckworth; Jones”).
345. See supra Part II.A. All of these proposals would require some additional staff for the
committees to manage the extra workload.
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picture of the operation: “That was fantastic, because we could trace
the intelligence, to targeting, to the operation itself.”346 These
“seamless presentations” are not only illuminating for Congress, but
they can also force the agencies to coordinate in advance of the
briefings and work out any interagency disagreements (as one interviewee pointed out, agencies cannot manipulate their committee
patrons to take their position when they brief multiple committees
with counterparts from across the government).347
There is no reason that joint briefings must be limited to such
extraordinary circumstances. The practice of bringing multiple committees together for briefings could become a more regular practice.
When multiple agencies are directly involved in an operation, the
committees that oversee them and therefore have equities in the
matter should be part of the briefing. While the armed services
committees may push back on any proposal that dilutes their
exclusive access, they may welcome opportunities to gain access to
information currently held only by the intelligence committees. In
this way, joint briefings could be designed to provide all the relevant
committees with access to information that they might otherwise
not receive.
3. Modify Classification Procedures
To further facilitate information sharing, Congress should modify rules to allow for sharing of classified information with members
and staff when necessary to effective oversight. As Part III explained, when information is classified, it can only be shared on a
need-to-know basis as determined by the executive.348 Classification
can prevent members of Congress from sharing certain information
with other congressional representatives, and it prevents staff from
sharing information across committees.349 With these rules in place,
increasing the number of cross-committee members would have a
limited effect. Even though these joint members would know the
relevant information, they would still be prohibited from sharing it
346.
347.
348.
349.

Interview with Congressional Staff Member #6, supra note 7.
Id.
Supra Part III.A.
See KAISER, supra note 84, at 5-6.
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with the rest of the committee.350 For example, as discussed in Part
III, during the Iran crisis concerning the Soleimani strike, Senator
Tim Kaine, who is a member of both the SFRC and SASC, knew relevant information about cyber operations from SASC but could not
share it with fellow members of the SFRC.351
To address this challenge, Congress should reform the rules governing the handling of classified information on the Hill. Specifically, Congress should permit members who have received classified
information to share that information with other members and
committee staff under clearly defined, limited circumstances.352 The
new rules might mirror the current Executive Order provision that
allows for “emergency disclosure” of classified information “when
necessary to respond to an imminent threat to life or in defense of
the homeland” to “an individual or individuals who are otherwise
not eligible for access,” without fully declassifying the information.353 For example, the law could specify that a “reasonable person
would need to find disclosure to the congressional representative or
staffer necessary for affecting a lawmaking function.” Though one
might be concerned that allowing members to share information
would lead to dangerous leaks, setting a clear standard would not
only allow Congress to better perform its oversight function but
could also provide structure to the already existing informal practice
of senators sharing classified information across committees.354

350. See id.
351. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #1, supra note 249.
352. This could be through an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (criminalizing the
disclosure of classified information) and/or an addition to the House and Senate rules governing disclosures by HPSCI and SSCI members, respectively. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 114TH CONG., R. X(11)(g), 15 (2015), https://rules.house.gov/sites/
democrats.rules.house.gov/files/114/PDF/House-Rules-114.pdf [https://perma.cc/78GJ-7LQ7];
S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. § 8(a) (1976) (enacted). These rules currently “provide a means for
disclosing classified information in the intelligence committees’ possession where the intelligence committee of the respective house (either the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence (HPSCI) or the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)) determines
by vote that such disclosure would serve the public interest.” JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., RS21900, THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 3
(2017).
353. Exec. Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, 721-22 (Jan. 5, 2010), reprinted as amended
in 75 Fed. Reg. 1013 (Jan. 8, 2010).
354. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
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There is precedent for such a modification. In 2010, a dispute
arose when members of the “Gang of Eight” and “Gang of Four”
were not permitted to share information with the full intelligence
committees.355 In response, Congress enacted legislation to modify
the notification procedures to allow members of the “Gangs” to
communicate more fully with members of the intelligence committees.356 President Obama threatened a veto but ultimately allowed
the changes.357
In addition to permitting greater information sharing of classified information specifically within Congress, the executive should
continue to rein in over-classification.358 Agency briefers should be
required to clarify the classification levels of each part of the briefing. The executive could also institute reforms to disincentivize
over-classification, including, for example, clarifying and strengthening classification guidelines; improving classification training for
executive branch agencies; reducing penalties for under-classifying;
and requiring classifiers to fill out an electronic form that describes
the damage classification is seeking to prevent.359 While the specific
details of how to modify classification processes extend beyond the
scope of this Article,360 ensuring that the executive branch clarifies
classification levels and only classifies information when absolutely
necessary would allow Congress to more easily exchange information, especially when that information does not expose sources and
methods. Reforming classification procedures, along with giving
355. See KAISER, supra note 84, at 6.
356. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-259, § 331(c),
124 Stat. 2654, 2685-86; see also KAISER, supra note 84, at 6-7.
357. See Conference Letter regarding S. 1494 and H.R. 2701, the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010 from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, to Hon. Dianne
Feinstein, Chairwoman, S. Select Comm. on Intel. (Mar. 15, 2010), https://abcnews.go.com/
images/Politics/Letter_Orszag_to_Feinstein_100316.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7BF-VSGR]; Presidential Statement on Signing the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1535 (Oct. 7, 2010).
358. See Examining the Costs of Overclassification on Transparency and Security: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 69-73 (2016) (statement of
Scott Amey, General Counsel, Project on Government Oversight); Doss, supra note 266.
359. See Elizabeth Goitein & David M. Shapiro, Reducing Overclassification Through Accountability, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 2-3 (2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/2019-08/Report_Reducing_Overclassification.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK9G-TGFX].
360. For a more detailed discussion of the classification system and recommended modifications to it, see Hathaway, supra note 53.
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Congress additional flexibility to share information internally,
would significantly facilitate the flow of information between related congressional committees.
4. Create a Congressional National Security Council
This brings us to an ambitious, but feasible, proposal: create a
Congressional National Security Council (C-NSC).
The fundamental challenge that Congress faces is that it has a
number of committees with distinct but overlapping jurisdictions.
The executive branch faces precisely the same problem: it is made
up of a number of agencies with distinct but overlapping jurisdictions. With the National Security Act of 1947, Congress created the
National Security Council (NSC) to address this problem for the
executive branch while ignoring parallel challenges in Congress.
The NSC was designed “to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the
national security so as to enable the military services and the other
departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more
effectively in matters involving the national security.”361 Initially,
NSC members included the President, Secretary of State, the new
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the
Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board,
and other officers “the President may designate from time to
time.”362 Each President has made some changes in NSC membership,363 but it has always included the key representatives from each
agency in the national security space.364 This allows those agencies
to coordinate and cooperate on cross-cutting national security
matters. Congress, however, has nothing comparable.
361. Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 101(a), 61 Stat. 495, 496 (later codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 et seq.).
362. Id. The CIA Director did not initially sit on the NSC, but instead served as an adviser
to it. See BEST, supra note 21, at 6-7.
363. For example, President Trump’s Director of the CIA sat on the NSC, but in the Biden
Administration the Director attends NSC meetings in an advisory capacity. See Eric Geller,
Trump Adding CIA Chief Back to National Security Council, POLITICO (Jan. 30, 2017, 3:45
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/trump-national-security-council-cia-234381
[https://perma.cc/3QZX-JCV4]; Memorandum on Renewing the National Security Council
System (NSM-2), 2021 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Feb. 4, 2021).
364. See generally BEST, supra note 21.
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There is no reason to accept that asymmetry as inevitable or
irremediable. Congress has recognized the need to improve interagency coordination within the executive branch on cross-cutting
matters.365 In the FY 2021 NDAA, Congress created the Office of
the National Cyber Director (NCD), headed by a Senate-confirmed,
cabinet-level official with a seat on the NSC.366 As the President’s
principal advisor on cybersecurity, the NCD is charged with
coordinating federal government activities on cybersecurity, cyber
defense, and related emerging technology issues.367 Supporters of
creating the office envisioned that the NCD would “break down silos
across the many agencies with cyber responsibilities.”368 Congress
has been willing to compel the executive branch to increase interagency coordination—even in the face of presidential opposition.369
But it has not been as keen about addressing the same issues that
it faces internally.370
Nothing is stopping Congress from solving the problem of information silos by creating a structure for itself that resembles the
NSC. A Congressional National Security Council (C-NSC) (or it
could be called a “working group”; the name is unimportant) could
bring together the leadership of each of the committees involved in
national security matters to coordinate on cross-cutting matters,
just as the NSC brings together the leadership of the agencies that
have equities in planning certain operations or activities.371 As one
interviewee explained, “We do some of this informally. If we see an
365. See generally S. REP. NO. 116-236 (2020).
366. FY 2021 NDAA, supra note 231, § 1752.
367. See id. § 1752(c)(1)(A)-(D).
368. Press Release, Rep. Jim Langevin (D-RI), House of Representatives, National Cyber
Director Act Will Be Included in Year-end Defense Bill (Dec. 3, 2020), https://langevin.house.
gov/press-release/national-cyber-director-act-will-be-included-year-end-defense-bill [https://
perma.cc/8LAM-M6BF].
369. The Trump administration opposed creating the National Cyber Director, having
eliminated the position of the White House cybersecurity coordinator in 2018. See Connor
O’Brien & Martin Matishak, Trump’s Defense Veto Would Torpedo Cyber Overhaul Amid
Unfolding Hack, POLITICO (Dec. 18, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/18/
trump-veto-ndaa-hack-448492 [https://perma.cc/A4PU-Z2L8].
370. Just as its executive branch counterpart, membership of the C-NSC can be flexible.
Just as each incoming President has discretion to define what falls within the ambit of
national security, briefing on important matters can be tailored to specific committees, or even
go beyond the armed services, intelligence, and foreign relations committees where
appropriate. See supra notes 33, 105.
371. See BEST, supra note 21, at 6.
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issue come up, we will crosswalk material.”372 But the interviewee
emphasized that this was the exception, not the rule.
The C-NSC would meet periodically to allow its members to brief
one another on matters in front of their committees that may be of
overlapping interest or in which the actions taken by the agencies
under one of their jurisdictions may have implications for decisions
before another committee. In the event that the chair and ranking
members are stretched too thin, they could deputize a member of
the committee to attend in their stead. The key goal would be to
create a structure for coordinating and exchanging information
across committees rather than relying on happenstance and the
decision of one member or staffer to crosswalk information. Of
course, it should be clear that sharing information is not an invitation to other committees to extend oversight over matters
briefed. Instead, the express purpose should be to better inform
committees about matters relevant to their own jurisdictions.373
The coordination at the member level should be reflected at the
staff level as well. Creating a staff-level working group would again
mirror the executive branch’s NSC, which coordinates on multiple
organizational levels—from working-level staff to principals374 (although the C-NSC would only have two levels: staff and members).
Even if members were not interested in spending the time necessary
to establish a member-level C-NSC, such an organization could still
be held at the staff level. As one staffer put it, “It should be possible
to have staff working groups.”375 Such a working group would meet
on occasion to share information about the matters in front of each
committee and coordinate actions as necessary. But the staffer
cautioned that a coordinating group would not work unless there is
372. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
373. As with any new institutional structure, how well this works will turn in significant
part on whether members work within the spirit of the institution—sharing information with
one another and respecting committee boundaries. One interviewee made clear that the
success of such a proposal will depend on excellent staff setting an appropriate agenda and
managing the information flow. Interview with former Congressional Staff Member #6, supra
note 7. Given the partisanship that mires Congress, establishing the C-NSC would also
require buy-in from senior congressional leadership. Members of the C-NSC could also
leverage the existing working relationships they have developed in committee as chairs and
ranking members of their respective committees to foster information exchanges.
374. See BEST, supra note 21, at 1.
375. Interview with Congressional Staff Member #5, supra note 22.
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awareness and responsiveness to concerns that staff are already
stretched thin: “It’s a time sink and it’s hard and it’s an additive
function. You would have to increase the budget for committees to
hire more staff to do this sort of thing.”376 This is undoubtedly true—
any significant reform leading to real improvements in Congress’s
capacity to properly oversee the executive branch will require
additional funding for congressional staff. Likewise, the C-NSC
would likely need its own staff, potentially nested under the congressional leadership offices, to set the group’s agenda and serve as
a secretariat.
Members that are on the C-NSC and their designated staff would
need to be given access to all of the relevant classified programs
overseen by each of the committees. This alone would significantly
facilitate information sharing. If the above proposal to include the
chair and ranking member of each of the key committees as exofficio members on each of the other committees is adopted, then
additional classified access would not be required; they would already receive access to allow them to fully participate in C-NSC
business. And if they do not, congressional leadership should insist
on it.
The advantage of creating this kind of superstructure is that the
C-NSC would not take legislative and oversight authority away
from the congressional committees. The C-NSC would not be a super committee. In fact, it would not be a committee at all. Rather,
like the NSC, the C-NSC would be a coordinating body that exists
to allow for regular meetings to consider operations and matters
that have cross-jurisdictional effects. The C-NSC would provide a
level playing field, where all committee leadership has a seat at the
table, no committee has a leading role, and all committees understand the stakes of the matters discussed. This level playing field
would significantly facilitate inter-committee dialogue and information exchanges. The proposals recommended above—augment exofficio membership and permit inter-committee sharing of classified
information—would further assist the C-NSC in its work, but their
implementation is not essential. What is essential is creating space
for members to discuss ways in which the matters in front of each

376. Id.
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committee may affect those in front of their own, and learning
critical information that they would not otherwise receive through
formal reporting channels from the executive branch. As a result, CNSC members would return to their committees better informed
and better prepared to conduct oversight.
Information siloing is ultimately a problem of Congress’s own
making—the result of political infighting and jurisdictional turf
wars. Thus, the onus should be on Congress to ensure that members
and committees have the information they need to legislate and
properly oversee the executive branch. In comparison to proposals
that would require federal agencies to brief more committees, as
described in Section IV.A, a C-NSC would make Congress, rather
than the executive, responsible for ensuring that information is
effectively shared and disseminated. A C-NSC would not even
require support from the White House. All it requires is recognition
from members of Congress, particularly committee leadership, that
coordination and information sharing are essential to overseeing the
cross-jurisdictional issues that make up much of modern warfare.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-first century warfare no longer maps onto committee
structures that were created to oversee twentieth-century warfare.
Modern military operations do not fit into neat institutional boxes.
They are complex and cross-cutting, drawing together intelligence
and military tools, techniques, and assets to respond to threats
abroad.
As this Article has shown, jurisdictional turf battles and rigid
classification rules inhibit adequate information sharing across
Congress. Jurisdictional jealousies and the realities of legislating
today through the NDAA process have produced information silos
that impede Congress’s ability to effectively perform its oversight
responsibilities. Modern warfare in particular has brought this
pathology to the fore. As a result, today’s oversight system is one in
which many congressional committees know something about
significant military and covert action operations, but no member of
Congress is in a position to put all these pieces together.
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This is not merely a concern for constitutional formalists, who
worry about the effect this has on Congress’s capacity to exercise its
constitutional obligations. It also has real-world effects, leading to
situations like the tragedy in Niger described at the outset of this
Article377 or Senator Tim Kaine’s inability to share vital information
related to the killing of Major General Soleimani from a classified
SASC briefing with his colleagues on the SFRC.378 In short, Congress’s inability to gain a complete picture of modern warfare
operations and capabilities harms the U.S. government’s ability to
protect U.S. national security.
But if the bad news is that this problem is of Congress’s own
making, the good news is that it is within the power of Congress to
fix it. If Congress wishes to conduct effective oversight over a rapidly evolving set of modern warfare capabilities, it must bring down
the walls that stand in the way of adequate information sharing. In
1947, Congress recognized the importance of cooperation among
executive branch agencies working on national security matters,
and it passed legislation that gave rise to a new National Security
Council to encourage information sharing, collaboration, and cooperation across executive branch agency boundaries. It is time for
Congress to bring the same revolution to its own institutional
structures.

377. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.

